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ABSTRACT 
Reflective functioning in patients with panic disorder with or without agoraphobia: an 
examination of the effects of comorbid personality disorders 
by 
Tempe A. Watts 
 
Advisers: Diana Diamond, Ph.D. and Barbara Milrod, M.D. 
This study examined reflective functioning (RF) in patients who experience a 
combination of panic and personality disorders (PD).  Despite broadly accepted beliefs that 
comorbid personality and Axis I disorders indicate poor prognosis, limited research has 
examined how these two axes interact within a panic disorder population. The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders typifies personality disorders as fitting different clusters 
categorization: cluster A referring to “odd” personality disorders, including schizoid, schizotypal 
and paranoid PDs; cluster B referring to “dramatic” personality disorders, including borderline, 
narcissistic, histrionic and antisocial PDs; and cluster C referring to “anxious” personality 
disorders, including avoidant, dependent and obsessive compulsive PD.  Reflective functioning 
is a measure for the concept of mentalization, or an individuals’ ability to understand mental 
states in themselves and others link their mental states to behavior and symptoms, while bearing 
in mind the inferential nature of this process.   
This study proposed that in a panic disorder sample: the presence of any personality 
disorder will yield predictably low RF scores; that the presence of cluster B PDs will predict low 
RF scores; and that the interaction of cluster B with cluster A or cluster C PDs will predict low 
RF scores.  This project determined that within this sample, the presence of personality disorders 
is not related to RF score.  Furthermore, no relationship between cluster B PDs and RF was 
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found and no statistically significant interaction was determined.  However, a statistical trend 
toward significance for a three way interaction between clusters A, B and C with regard to RF 
scores was evident, although the nature of this relationship was not able to be specified by this 
dataset.  The results suggest that in a sample with the primary diagnosis of panic disorder, RF 
does not specifically correlate with differences in personality disorders.  This project may 
demonstrate limitations in the use of RF to distinguish personality disorders for patients with 
panic disorder. Further study into the relationship between PDs and panic disorder is warranted, 
particularly with regard to what aspects of panic or personality symptomatology become 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The treatment of patients with panic disorder, with or without agoraphobia, has a rich 
body of research supporting efficacy of several types of psychotherapies. Outcome researchers 
have only just begun to examine the factors that account for the variability in responsiveness to 
treatment, such as patient characteristics and therapist implementation (Boswell et al., 2013).  In 
particular, patients who experience a combination of Axis I and personality disorders drop out of 
psychotherapy at high rates and have comparatively lower response rates to treatment than 
patients without personality disorders (McGlashan, 1986; Stone, 1993; Fournier et al., 2008) and 
may suffer serious physical health conditions (El-Gabalawy et al., 2010). Despite the broadly 
accepted notion that the presence of personality disorders in addition to Axis I symptoms 
indicates poor prognosis, there has been limited systematic clinical trials research examining 
how these axes, using criteria defined by the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual, interact (Skodol et 
al. 2014; Telch et al, 2011, Siever & Davis, 1991).  Further research is needed to understand how 
admixtures of syndromes may affect various aspects of functioning and the outcome of 
therapeutic interventions. This project will study patients with panic disorder with and without 
personality disorders to investigate whether or not this relationship interferes with response.  
Specifically, the construct of mentalization (Fonagy, Gergeley, Jurist & Target, 2002), which 
will be further described below, will be taken into account as a cognitive-affective capacity that 
may differ across diagnoses. 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 4
th
 edition Text Edition, (DSM-IV-TR)
1
 
organized psychiatric diagnosis across five axes, to account for a range of factors that were 
                                                          
1
 For the purposes of consistency, the DSM-IV-TR will be referred to in the past tense, to acknowledge 
the publication of the DSM-5 (APA, 2013).  However, diagnostic criteria discussed in this study will 
exclusively refer to DSM-IV-TR standards, as the measures involved were based on that edition. 
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thought to have an impact on mental health.  Axis I referred to clinical syndromes, including 
panic disorder and other anxiety and mood disorders (disorders of “state”), while Axis II referred 
to developmental disorders, and personality disorders (PDs) (disorders of trait).  The division and 
standardization of psychiatric classifications based on potentially episodic phenomenology (Axis 
I) and personality disorders (Axis II) has been operationalized since the construction of The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 3
rd
 edition (DSM-III, 1980), and used until the recent 
publication of the DSM-5.   
Clinical trials have improved our ability to understand and develop effective treatments 
for discrete disorders.  Panic Control Therapy (PCT, Barlow, Raffa, & Cohen, 2002), a cognitive 
behavioral therapy, was specifically designed and studied for panic disorder, and found to be 
efficacious.  A multicenter controlled trial compared PCT, imipramine and their combination, 
with pill placebo using the measure the Panic Disorder Severity Scale (PDSS; Shear et al., 1997; 
Shear et al., 2001) as the primary outcome measure to record response.  Intent to treat (ITT) 
analysis found that PCT alone yielded response rates at the end of three months of weekly 90 
minute treatment sessions averaging at 48.7%, 39.5% after six months of monthly maintenance 
treatment, and 32.4% six months after treatment termination (after 9 months of therapy; Barlow, 
Gorman, Shear & Woods, 2000).  ITT analysis of combined treatment of imipramine and CBT 
yielded response rates at 60.3% at end of weekly treatment, 57.1% after six months of monthly 
maintenance treatment, and 25.0% six months after treatment termination.  Meta-analyses of 
CBT studies have found that on average, 40% of patients entered into randomized controlled 
trials of PCT are non-responders (Levitt, et al., 2001; Mitte, 2005), with response rates ranging 
29-48%.   
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The reasons for non-response to Cognitive Behavioral Therapy in panic disorder have 
been inadequately characterized, although frequently discussed.  Studies of CBT have reported 
mixed effects of Axis II co-morbidity on treatment response.  Hoffart (1994) found worse CBT 
outcomes for panic disorder inpatients with co-morbid dramatic and avoidant traits (N = 50 with 
panic disorder and agoraphobia).  However, Dreessen et al. (1994) reported treatment effects 
were not diminished by the presence of co-morbid personality disorders in 2 open trials of 
standard, time limited CBT (N = 31, N= 57 for panic disorder inpatients with comorbid 
personality disorders).  Bienvenu and Brandes (2005) argued against what they describe as the 
“gross overgeneralization” that extremes in any personality traits with comorbid anxiety 
disorders adversely affect response to treatment.  However, in a descriptive paper, Ozkan and 
Altindag (2005) found that panic disorder patients with comorbid personality disorders were 
more severely ill across mood, anxiety and psychosocial domains than panic disorder patients 
without personality disorders.   
Panic Focused Psychodynamic Psychotherapy, a manualized, time-limited 
psychodynamic psychotherapy for panic disorder, has been studied far less extensively, but a 
pilot study showed efficacy (PFPP, Milrod, Busch & Cooper, 1997; Milrod et al., 2007) and was 
replicated by Beutel and colleagues (2013). In the 2007 study, Axis II/Cluster C personality 
disorders (“avoidant” PDs, as described below) moderated treatment response to PFPP (N = 24 
with PDs, N = 19 patients with panic disorder and Cluster C co-morbid personality disorders) 
such that subjects with panic disorder and a comorbid Cluster C disorder improved to a greater 
extent than those without Cluster C comorbidity, an unusual finding.  Small sample size did not 
allow for clear distinctions to be made between cluster C and other PDs.  In both CBT and PFPP, 
personality disorders may have some influence on treatment outcome, although the nature of this 
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impact has been under researched.  The Practice Guidelines for Panic Disorder for the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA, 2009) recommend that research continue to explore the 
effectiveness of psychodynamic psychotherapies in the treatment of panic disorder with other co-
occurring disorders such as co-morbid personality disorders.   
Personality disorders, as defined by DSM-IV-TR, are rigid or ingrained maladaptive 
patterns of thinking, feeling or behaving.
2
  PDs have been vague and poorly described, with 
similar or overlapping criteria.  High incidence of co-morbidity between personality disorders 
are consistently found (Craske et al., 2009) but it is unclear if the prevalence of co-morbid 
diagnoses is due to verifiable and distinguishable co-occurring disorders. Vague and similar 
classifications may account for some portion of high rates of co-morbidity.  Further examination 
of patients with co-morbid disorders may lend insight into underlying pathology and help 
sharpen definitions and refine distinctions between personality disorders.  Using the models of 
Axis II disorders accepted in the DSM-IV-TR, this paper will further clarify variance between 
people who may fall into these different diagnostic categories.  
Patients with anxiety and comorbid personality disorders complain of more acute 
symptoms, such as severity of anxiety, than anxiety patients without personality disorders (Van 
Velzen & Emmelkamp, 1999).  The reasons for this have not been firmly established but rigid 
personality factors may limit how individuals respond to anxiety, which may in turn exacerbate 
anxiety (Tonna et al. 2011; Uguz et al. 2009).  In fact, the case for a dimensional system for 
                                                          
2
 This study used the ADIS-IV and SCID-II to assess Axis I and Axis II diagnoses and therefore adheres 
to the DSM-IV definitions.  However, definitions in the DSM-5 for both panic disorder and personality 
disorders are essentially as they were in the DSM-IV, amid and despite intense controversy in the field 
regarding definitions of personality disorders (McGlashan et al., 2005).   
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personality disorders, debated prior to the publication of The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 
5
th
 edition (DSM-5) was argued, in part, because of the close interplay between Axis I disorders 
and Axis II disorders.  The Collaborative Longitudinal Personality Disorders Study (CLPS) 
study found both that personality disorders are not always stable and chronic, and that mood 
disorders are more chronic and less episodic than had typically been assumed (Skodol et al., 
2011; Skodol, et al. 2010).  Furthermore, in the CLPS study, patients with major depressive 
disorder (MDD) who were also diagnosed with schizotypal, borderline, or avoidant personality 
disorders as their primary PD diagnosis had significantly longer time to remission from MDD 
than did patients with MDD without a co-occurring PD (Skodol et al., 2005).  Even controlling 
for other negative prognostic features, such as age of onset of MDD, pattern of MDD recurrence, 
co-occurring dysthymia and other Axis I disorder comorbidity, PDs remained robust predictors 
of slowed remission of symptoms of MDD.  Understanding factors associated with comorbid 
symptoms of panic and personality disorders may lead to more precise description of mental 
disorders, and stimulate greater specificity in targeted treatments.   
In this study, mentalization, as measured on The Reflective Function Scale (RF; Fonagy 
et al., 1995; Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998; Rudden et al., 2006), will be examined to 
offer further insight into the relationship between Axis I disorders, as described on the Anxiety 
Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV Lifetime Version (ADIS-IV), and personality 
pathology, as measured on the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality 
Disorders (SCID-II; First et al, 1997).  Distinctions made on the relationship between panic 




     
Mentalization is broadly defined as the capacity to perceive and interpret behavior in 
terms of intentional mental states (i.e. needs, desires, feelings, beliefs, goals, purposes, and 
reasons) (Fonagy et al., 1995; Fonagy & Target, 2006; Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002).  
Fonagy and Target (2006) describe this as a “mostly preconscious imaginative mental activity,” 
in that the process requires imagining the inner states of others and, especially reflective  
mentalization, that is, the awareness that suppositions about others’ minds, and one’s own mind, 
are not irrefutable truth.  Mentalization requires attentional control, which can be challenging 
during emotionally charged states, in order to selectively activate a sense of one’s own or others’ 
minds regarding particular intentions.   
The Reflective Function Scale (RF; Fonagy et al., 1995; Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 
1998; Rudden et al., 2006) was developed to operationally measure degree of mentalization in 
the context of attachment relationships. Individuals differ significantly in the degree to which 
they are able to understand thoughts and feelings, both their own, and those of other people.  
Higher or lower RF scores indicate exceptional and diminished mentalization, respectively. In 
cases of diminished mentalization (i.e. low RF), one’s own and others’ behavior can seem 
unpredictable and other people’s minds may seem opaque and may therefore be interpreted with 
significant distortion.  With the (apparent) absence of mentalization (i.e. negative RF), the task 
itself of reflecting on another person’s mind or reflecting on one’s own thoughts or feelings can 
be experienced as an attack and may be actively rejected.  The interaction of intense affective 
states and the capacity for mentalization is speculated to have an influential relationship on affect 
regulation (Solbakken et al., 2011). 
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The theory of mentalization emerged out of an incorporation of “theory of mind” 
research, attachment theory, and psychoanalytic concepts (Fonagy et al., 2002).  The 
development of mentalization is speculated to be essential to an elaboration of a sense of self and 
to self-regulation, specifically supporting affect regulation.  Different personality disorders are 
associated with varying capacities and strategies for managing affect.  RF has been most 
frequently studied in patients diagnosed with borderline personality disorder for the purpose of 
comparing differences in the capacity for mentalization and understanding the role of pre-
treatment mentalization in mediating treatment outcome. RF has consistently been found to be 
low (3 or below) in patients diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, who struggle with 
affect regulation (Fonagy et al., 1998; Levy et al., 2006).  The capacity to mentalize has both 
state and trait characteristics (Fonagy, Bateman & Luyten, 2012).  Mentalization is not a fixed 
and stable capacity, but rather can fluctuate during shifting self-states, particularly under deep 
distress, or in reaction to an interpersonal context (Fonagy, Bateman & Luyten, 2012; Sperry, 
2013; Chefetz, 2013). 
Examination of the influence of mentalization across the range of non-BPD personality 
disorders is a new but expanding field of inquiry. Reflective function has begun to be 
investigated for patients with specific Axis I disorders, such as major depression, panic disorder 
and post-traumatic stress disorder (Fischer-Kern et al., 2008; Rudden et al., 2006; Markowitz et 
al., 2013). Further knowledge about the capacity for mentalization in a wider range of disorders 
may help to refine understanding of the underlying dynamics of symptoms and characteristics 
that define these disorders. 
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This project will examine the capacity for mentalization in a sample of patients with 
primary DSM-IV-TR panic disorder with or without co-morbid Axis II diagnoses, with a range 
of severity, as diagnosed by the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV Lifetime 
Version (ADIS-IV) and Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders 
(SCID-II; First et al, 1997). The data are drawn from one site of a two-site, randomized 
controlled trial (Barbara Milrod and Jacques Barber, Principle Investigators NIMH R01 
MH70918-01A2; R01-MH070664) comparing three psychotherapy interventions for primary 
DSM-IV-TR panic disorder: Panic-Focused Psychodynamic Psychotherapy (Milrod, Busch, 
Cooper, & Shapiro, 1997), Panic Control Therapy (Barlow, Raffa & Cohen, 2002), and Applied 
Relaxation Training (Chambless, Schwalberg, Relaxation Therapy Manual). The subjects 
compared in this investigation comprise patients who were diagnosed with primary panic 
disorder by ADIS-IV-L with minimum severity (of 4/8) and did not have substance or alcohol 
dependence, bipolar disorder, organic mental disorders or psychosis.  I will compare RF scores 
of patients with panic disorder with or without agoraphobia, across Axis II disorder diagnoses, 
nested in one of the three clusters of personality disorder, as defined by the DSM-IV-TR.  These 
comparison groups will be further detailed in the Results section. 
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CHAPTER 2:  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This study examines the relationship between reflective function and personality 
disorders in patients with primary panic disorder, with and without agoraphobia, recruited to a 
psychotherapy research study.  The following literature review is presented in four sections, 
beginning with an overview of panic disorder, discussing treatment options as well as potential 
considerations in non-response to first-line interventions.  The second section will examine 
issues regarding patients with personality disorders, and consider treatment complications posed 
by co-occurring Axis I and Axis II disorders.  The third section will review the concept of 
mentalization and reflective functioning as it pertains to Axis I and II comorbidity.  This section 
will examine the theoretical basis for RF and reviews empirical research documenting the 
relationship between RF and personality disorders.  The fourth section will propose a 
relationship between RF and the three clusters of personality disorders (which will be described 
below).   
 
PANIC DISORDER 
Definition and Prevalence 
A panic attack is defined by the DSM-IV-TR as a sudden or unexpected onset of intense 
fear or discomfort, during which four or more physical symptoms occur for a discrete period of 
time.  Any combination of the following physical symptoms may include: racing heart, sweating, 
trembling/shaking, shortness of breath, feeling of choking, chest pain/discomfort, 
nausea/abdominal distress, dizziness/unsteady feeling, derealization/depersonalization, chills/hot 
10 
 
     
flushes, numbness, fear of losing control, fear of going crazy and fear of dying.  These symptoms 
typically peak within ten minutes.  A diagnosis of panic disorder is warranted if panic attacks 
become recurrent over a period of one month or more, with at least one of following three 
responses: unrelenting concern for further attacks, worry about the consequences of panic 
attacks, especially on one’s mental or physical health, or a significant change in behavior to 
avoid additional panic attacks.  Panic disorder is specified to occur with or without agoraphobia.  
Agoraphobia is defined as intense anxiety and persistent avoidance of situations or places from 
which, in the event of a panic attack, obtaining help or escaping might be difficult.  
Estimates of prevalence rates for panic disorder without agoraphobia have remained 
relatively constant over time and across populations, and range from approximately 1-2% to 
3.7% of adults (Yates, 2009; Kessler et. al, 2006).  The lifetime prevalence of panic disorder 
with agoraphobia is 1.1%, while 0.8% of the general population is estimated to suffer 
agoraphobia without panic disorder following an isolated panic attack (Kessler et. al, 2006).  
According to the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (Kessler, et al. 2005), 23% of 
patients with panic disorder also have agoraphobia, although this number has been found to be as 
high as one-third to one-half of panic patients (Yates, 2009).  Almost a quarter of the general 
population (22.7%) suffers from an isolated panic attack without going on to develop panic 
disorder or agoraphobia.  Panic disorder patients have been estimated to account for 
approximately 21% of emergency room visits and are 12.6 times as likely to visit emergency 
rooms as the general population, at considerable financial cost (Swinson et al., 1992; Markowitz 
et al, 1989; Hunsley, 2003).   They also have higher rates of morbidity and health care utilization 
relative to patients with other psychiatric diagnoses and primary care patients without psychiatric 
diagnoses (Korczak et al., 2007; Klerman et al, 1991; Katerndahl & Realini, 1995). Furthermore, 
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the frequency with which panic attacks, and the suffering that even isolated panic attacks can 
bring (Klerman et al., 1991), suggests that clinicians treating patients who experience only 
temporary panic symptoms would benefit from complex understanding of this disorder 
Development of panic disorder  
Although there is general consensus in research regarding risk factors that contribute to 
the development of panic attacks, the etiology of panic remains debatable. Panic disorder is 
theorized to develop through a combination of constitutional genetic and temperamental factors 
and environmental influences. Theoretical models have typically been formulated with the 
purpose of indicating treatment recommendations, although at this time, no single theoretical 
model has been found to be unifying and irrefutable in terms of causal or predictive dynamics.  A 
full accounting of the history of these theories would not be relevant to the aims of this study but 
a brief summary of conceptualized mechanisms of panic disorder follow. 
Psychiatric genetic studies have identified panic disorder is a heritable disease. First 
degree relatives of participants in these studies with panic attacks have from three to twenty-one 
fold higher lifetime risk of panic than relatives of participants without panic disorder (Smoller & 
Tsuang, 1998).  Furthermore, relatives of participants in these studies are more likely to suffer 
from panic disorder than other forms of anxiety disorders (Fyer, 1995).   
Temperamental variables have been identified as heritable phenotypes that predispose 
individuals to the development of anxiety disorders.  Among these variables are behavioral and 
personality descriptors observed in children and adults prior to the development of panic 
disorder.  The presence of behavioral inhibition, a tendency in childhood to display fear, shyness 
or avoidance of novel situations (Kagan, 1987), is associated with the development of anxiety 
disorders (Craske & Waters, 2005; Smoller et al., 2005).  Neuroticism is an adult personality trait 
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(Eysenck, 1967; McCrae & Costa, 1987; Craske, 2001), characterized by high sensitivity and 
vulnerability to negative emotion, and is associated with the onset of anxiety disorders.  In a 
hierarchical model, Craske and Waters (2005) proposed that the presence of behavioral 
inhibition and neuroticism, with contributing genetic loading, cognitive and familial variables, 
predispose an individual to development of some anxiety disorders, including panic disorder. 
Psychotherapeutic theories on panic disorder 
Cognitive behavioral theory 
Cognitive behavioral therapy is a first-line psychotherapeutic intervention for panic 
disorder with the most empirical support, although the most recent Practice Guidelines for Panic 
Disorder from the American Psychiatric Association (2009) references the success of panic-
focused psychodynamic psychotherapy (PFPP, Milrod, Busch, Cooper & Shapiro, 1997; Milrod, 
et al., 2007) as an initial treatment in accordance with patient preference.  In the cognitive 
behavioral model of panic disorder, fear of panic attacks and their consequences produces a 
general ‘fear of fear’, leading to anticipatory anxiety and phobic avoidance (Chambless & 
Gracely, 1989).  Interoceptive conditioning is identified as maintaining panic disorder, as 
associative learning forges a link between transient or even normal bodily sensations and the 
unpleasant experience of having a panic attack.  Low-level bodily/somatic sensations of anxiety 
or simple arousal become conditioned stimuli, which then elicit additional anxiety or panic.  This 
experience attenuates the body’s response to conditioned stimuli, further increasing vulnerability 
to panic attacks (Craske and Waters, 2005).  Therefore, cognitive behavioral treatments for panic 
disorder use interoceptive exposure to ameliorate this conditioning. 
Contributing to the “fear of fear,” panic disorder patients are thought to suffer from 
“catastrophic misinterpretations” of bodily sensations (Clark, 1986).  That is, normal bodily 
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sensations are imbued with dangerous misinterpretation and meaning. Based on the characteristic 
of ‘out of the blue’ panic attacks, implicit memories activate the amygdala, and these 
interpretations may therefore take place at a conscious or unconscious level (Craske and Waters, 
2005).  Due to the perceived inability to control these feelings, patients become afraid of all 
strong affects (Williams et al., 1997).  This serves to support the overly sensitive responses of 
patients to normal body sensations as they are prone to becoming overwhelmed by strong 
emotions.  Cognitive restructuring, as part of cognitive behavioral treatments, intends to modify 
patients’ irrational thought patterns that lead to “catastrophic misinterpretation” (Craske and 
Waters, 2005). Both pharmacological and cognitive behavioral therapies attempt to support 
patients’ capacity for emotion regulation. CBT attempts to enhance executive functioning 
through cognitive restructuring and lessening patients’ sensitivity and reactivity to anxiety 
through exposure.   
Psychodynamic theory 
The psychodynamic approach to panic disorder emphasizes unconscious conflicts, 
defensive coping styles, and disturbed object relational schemata that are theorized to underlie 
the disorder and contribute to the severity of symptoms.  This perspective does not contradict the 
diathesis model, wherein a combination of physiological vulnerability and environmental factors 
predispose a person to panic disorder (Busch et al., 1991; Milrod et al., 1997). 
Although psychodynamic theories of panic disorder have evolved over time, the basis of 
these ideas derives from Freud’s (1895) description of “anxiety neurosis” originating from 
unconscious conflict.  He theorized that the structure and process of anxiety neurosis arises out 
of an “accumulation of excitation,” as a result of the “deflection of somatic sexual excitement.”  
He observed affect dysregulation and ineffective management of strong impulses in these 
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patients. Freud (1926) later revised his theory of anxiety, developing the idea of “signal anxiety,” 
which was defined as a normal and adaptive mechanism in response to psychological threats.  
This theory integrated the function of the ego in employing and managing defenses.  Appropriate 
levels of anxiety signal the ego to launch psychological defenses.  In this way, signal anxiety 
supports the ego in protecting itself from unconscious overwhelming affect.  When the ego is not 
successful in this process, traumatic levels of anxiety may occur.  Panic attacks represent a 
breakthrough of traumatic level anxiety.  In this way, intrapsychic conflict is hypothesized to be 
central in the development of panic symptoms.  Symptoms are viewed as a compromise 
formation between an unacceptable wish and the defense against that wish (Freud, 1926; Milrod 
et al., 1997). 
Freud’s theory on the function of signal anxiety has significantly contributed to the basis 
for current psychodynamic understandings of the development of panic disorder.  Failure of 
signal anxiety is thought to cause a traumatic level of anxiety to flood the ego, resulting in panic 
attacks (Diamond, 2004; Milrod et al., 1997; Busch et al., 1999). As hypothesized by Freud 
(1926), signal anxiety is proposed to alert the ego to the presence of danger, but traumatic 
anxiety is experienced as actual danger, overwhelming the ego’s capacity for symbolic 
representation.  The failure of signal anxiety may arise in cases of ego weakness, real trauma or 
cumulative trauma. In this instance, cumulative trauma is described as repeated “micro” traumas, 
often as a result of severe disturbances in the early relationship with the caregiver (Diamond, 
2004). These disruptions interfere with the development of regulatory faculties, including the 
symbolizing function of signal anxiety.  Therefore, these individuals are more vulnerable to 
being overwhelmed by flooding of emotions.  This ego immaturity contributes to charged and 
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ambivalent experiences in separations and the development of autonomy, as the individual lacks 
the ego strengths to function independently. 
In one model integrating constitutional factors and parenting style, Shear and colleagues 
(1993) suggested that some anxiety, particularly an avoidant defensive style, arises out of 
vulnerabilities in temperament interacting with early relationship disruptions.  They theorized 
that “inborn fear of unfamiliar situations, augmented by frightening, overcontrolling parental 
behaviors, predisposes [the individual] to incomplete resolution of conflicts between dependence 
and independence” (p. 862). This perspective observes that some individuals who experience 
panic attacks are prone to feeling suffocated by other people and they excessively seek a sense of 
independence while others with panic are sensitive to separation and are excessively dependent 
on others.  In either case, one way of describing the object relational pattern of panic disorder 
patients is weak representations of the self and powerful representations of the other.  Defenses 
remain directed toward maintaining a tolerable distance from others.  In turn, this coping strategy 
produces avoidance of unfamiliar situations and, cyclically, overvaluing threats while perceiving 
the self as infantile and unable to manage situations.   
Milrod et al. (1997) have further theorized on panic patients’ poor affect regulation to 
note that disavowed anger becomes a dangerous and difficult emotion for patients with panic to 
experience.  This association develops as the child becomes angry and she perceives the parent’s 
behavior to be rejecting or frightening.  However, the child believes that the parent cannot 
tolerate or survive her rage, and that it will destroy the parent or the parent’s relationship to the 
child, a devastating and frightening loss for the dependent child.  Due to this fear, the child 
suppresses her rage. Any awareness of this rage contributes to further binding the child to the 
parent, in an unconscious attempt to undo rageful fantasies.  This process can establish a vicious 
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cycle, as fear of loss can then increase the child’s dependency on the parent, leading to further 
frustration and rage toward the parent, as the child views the parent as the source of her 
inadequacies.  The defense against unconscious anger is one aspect of the cycle of panic and is 
further reinforced if the parent correspondingly resists the child’s attempts at independence.  The 
child may feel incomplete without the primary object and struggle to fully develop a separate, 
coherent sense of self.  Furthermore, the child can develop a sense of inadequacy if the parent 
overtly or implicitly supports the belief that the child cannot tolerate separation (Busch et al., 
1999; Milrod et al., 1997).  
As the child is faced with new developmental tasks, such as during the resolution of the 
oedipal phase, this previously established fear of loss is reinforced by normative anger at the 
parent.  For these patients, it seems as if regression to a more dependent position is preferable to 
the danger of facing greater autonomy (Shear et al., 1993; Milrod et al., 1997).  As the child 
grows into an adult, terror of autonomy reinforces the sense of inadequacy and emotional 
dependence, which in turn maintains the reluctance to separate from attachment figures (Klass et 
al., 2008).  Thus, the panic patient enacts and reinforces her fear that she will not function 
without the object. 
In order to avoid experiencing painful emotions, the patient uses defenses of denying, 
displacing or projecting negative affects (Rudden et al., 2008).  Instead, attention is focused on 
the physical symptoms of the panic attack, supporting the patient’s defense to distract from 
emotional conflicts and intensity.  The development of this physical and emotional disability 
creates a perceived need for care from others (Busch et al., 1999).  In this way, the patient is able 
to avoid functioning independently, keeping important objects in caretaking roles.  Panic 
disorder patients demonstrate a failure in defenses to effectively cope with anxiety and rage. 
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Psychodynamic theory of panic disorder emphasizes that the symptoms themselves carry 
emotional significance.  Milrod and colleagues (1997) argue that, while catastrophic 
misinterpretation is typical in the development of panic disorder, specific constellations of 
symptoms relate to specific underlying emotionally-driven meanings for individual patients.  
Through the patient’s associations to the context of the panic attacks and specific symptoms, it is 
possible to identify events or thoughts that triggered the attack.  Patients’ associations to body 
sensations often reveal body memories or unconscious fantasies that are psychologically 
connected to the physical symptoms.  These thoughts or fantasies are expressed somatically 
(Milrod et al., 1997; Shear et al., 1993).  
Psychotherapies for panic disorder 
There are several known effective treatments for panic disorder.  A number of 
pharmacological agents and cognitive behavioral therapy are considered first line treatments 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2007; Lydiard, Otto, Milrod, 2001).  However, a subset of 
patients does not respond or suffers relapse after receiving these therapies.  In a multi-site study 
of panic disorder, Barlow and colleagues (2000) compared the efficacy of CBT, imipramine, 
their combination, placebo only, or CBT plus placebo. They found a 48.7% response rate to CBT 
alone and 60.3% response rate for patients treated with a combination of medication and CBT 
immediately following three months of treatment, dropping to 37.8% remission rate for CBT 
alone and 57.1% for combination therapy following a six-month period of maintenance 
treatment, dropping further to 31.9% for CBT alone and 26.3% for the combination group six 
months after discontinuing therapy and medication.  
In a small study (n= 44) of CBT for panic disorder, Marks and colleagues reported that 
29% of subjects were classified as “nonresponders,” and continued to experience panic attacks 
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following the end of the treatment (Marks et al., 1993).  CBT has a good record of maintaining 
therapeutic improvement for panic disorder (Brown & Barlow, 1995), however, a significant 
proportion of patients have been found to relapse after response to all initially efficacious 
treatments (Craske et al., 1991, Barlow et al., 2000). 
Predictors of poor outcome, indicating greater level of anxiety symptoms and impaired 
social adjustment following treatment among patients with panic disorder, include: presence of 
personality disorders, severity of panic symptoms, phobic avoidance (agoraphobia), depression, 
and female gender (Yates, 2009; Kessler et al., 2006; Pollack & Otto, 1997; Slap & den Boer, 
2001; Pollack et al., 2000).  Results of a study examining differences between male and female 
patients with panic disorder on rates of co-occurring personality disorders found no gender 
differences (Barzega et al., 2001).  One study that specifically explored the co-occurrence of 
Axis I and II disorders in female and male patients with panic disorder with agoraphobia 
(Starcevic et al., 2008), found that women had a greater tendency to receive other comorbid Axis 
I diagnoses, particularly other anxiety disorders, while men were more likely to meet criteria for 
past alcohol abuse or dependence.  No differences were found for the mean number of co-
occurring Axis I and II diagnoses per patient.  The only significant gender difference in Axis II 
was a higher likelihood for women to meet criteria for dependent personality disorder.   
Heterogeneity of panic disorder 
These theories and accompanying techniques each describe the panic disorder patient 
population assuming a relatively stable and uniform group.  In fact, patients who meet DSM 
criteria for primary panic disorder may represent a heterogeneous population, with a range of co-
morbid personality disorders or other Axis I disorders, particularly depression. While therapist 
competence, therapy implementation and match compatibility with patient inevitably accounts 
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for some variation in responses to the treatment of panic, another contributing factor to 
differences in responses to treatment may be diversity within panic patient population.  Further 
data on differences between patients within this population may lead to better articulation of 




Definition and prevalence 
According to the DSM-IV-TR, personality disorders (PDs) are broadly defined as rigid or 
ingrained maladaptive patterns of thinking, feeling or behaving.  Such patterns have been 
described as long in duration, leading to significant distress and impairment not better accounted 
for by use of substances or another medical condition.  Although this stability of the condition of 
personality disorders has been the subject of debate (Skodol et al., 2005), especially with regard 
to proposals for change to the DSM-5, this is generally considered a central feature of PDs.  PDs 
constitute a significant public health problem, as a result of associated functional impairment, 
extensive treatment utilization, complications to treatments of other psychiatric disorders, such 
as major depression, and suicide risk (Skodol et al., 2005). 
As defined by the DSM-IV-TR, ten primary personality disorders have been identified 
and are separated into three clusters: cluster A comprises the “odd” personality disorders 
paranoid, schizoid, and schizotypal PDs; cluster B comprises the “dramatic” personality 
disorders anti-social, borderline, histrionic, and narcissistic PDs; and cluster C comprises the 
“anxious” personality disorders avoidant, dependent and obsessive compulsive PDs.  Two other 
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personality disorders, depressive personality disorder and passive-aggressive personality 
disorder, are evaluated using the SCID II and were included in previous versions of the DSM 
(the DSM-II and DSM-III-R, respectively).  Although they are not currently included in Axis II, 
they remain in Appendix B with other proposed disorders suggested for further study.   
In Part II of the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R) study of the general 
population  of the United States, personality disorder screening questions from the International 
Personality Disorder Examination (IPDE) were administered (N = 5692).  A probability sub-
sample was then interviewed with the IPDE and used to link screening question responses with 
IPDE clinical diagnoses. The method of Multiple Imputation (MI) was used to estimate 
prevalence and correlates of PDs in the full sample. The 12-month MI prevalence estimates were 
5.7% Cluster A, 1.5% Cluster B, 6.0% Cluster C, and 9.1% any PD (Lenzenweger et al., 2007).  
For individual DSM-IV/IPDE personality disorders, prevalence estimates were taken from the 
PD Clinical Reappraisal Sample (N = 214) and were approximated as follows : Paranoid PD 
2.3% (SE=0.8), Schizoid PD 4.9% (SE=2.2), Schizotypal PD 3.3% (SE=2.0), Borderline PD 
1.6% (SE=0.7), Antisocial PD 1.0% (SE=0.5), Histrionic PD 0.0% (SE=0.0), Narcissistic PD 
0.0% (SE=0.0), Avoidant PD 5.2% (SE=1.6), Dependent PD 0.6% (SE=0.4), Obsessive-
compulsive PD 2.4% (SE=0.8), and PD NOS 1.6% (SE=0.7).  These estimates are likely to be 
somewhat higher than in the population as there was a somewhat higher proportion of IPDE 
screening questions endorsed in the clinical reappraisal sample than the full sample as well as 





     
Criticism and limitations of current personality disorder definitions 
The DSM-IV-TR diagnostic system for personality disorders has been criticized for many 
reasons.  Limitations include the use of polythetic criteria rather than the identification of a 
central criterion, leading to extreme heterogeneity among patients receiving the same diagnosis.  
The number of criteria necessary for diagnosis of each personality disorder leads to potential 
underrating of meaningful character pathology, requiring the use of the PD NOS category.  
Furthermore, the current rating system of the DSM-IV-TR does not include a standard for 
evaluating severity in personality disorder nor does it identify strengths or protections against 
dysfunction (Tyrer, 2005; Skodol et al., 2005). 
DSM-IV-TR diagnoses of personality disorders have been criticized for their vague 
definitions and lack of basis in research.  As defined in DSM-IV-TR, overlapping and vague 
criteria may lead some personality disorder symptomatology to be subsumed under multiple 
diagnostic categories, resulting in the diagnosis of multiple disorders (Clark, 2007; Oldham et 
al., 1992; Zimmerman, Rothchild, & Chelminski, 2005).  Alternatively, some symptoms may be 
left out of diagnostic descriptions if full criteria for a given disorder are not met in favor of the 
primary diagnosis. While these outcomes, either multiple comorbidities, or existing symptoms 
not being reflected in any diagnosis, may be appropriate, there is little hierarchical accounting.  
Other types of PDs, such as histrionic PD, have been found inadequately described as a valid and 
separate diagnosis (Bakkevig & Karterud, 2010).  Furthermore, the CLPS project findings called 
into question the DSM-IV-TR defined stability of PD criteria (Grillo et al., 2000; Skodol et al., 
2005).  The lack of specificity in the general definition of PD, pervasive co-occurrences among 
DSM-IV-TR PDs, limited validity for some existing PDs, instability of current PD criteria, and 
arbitrary diagnostic thresholds led the Personality and Personality Disorders Work Group to 
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recommend a significant reorganization of the diagnostic process for personality disorders for the 
DSM-5.  However, despite years of debate and revision, no specific diagnostic changes were 
adopted, although the multiaxial system itself was eliminated.  Due to the above limitations of 
the current diagnostic process of PDs, it would be useful in the ongoing debates to specify 
characteristics associated with the current categories of PDs used in the DSM-IV-TR, and now 
DSM-5.  Further understanding of the interaction between what has been known as Axis I and II 
might indicate patterns in personality and symptoms that make up different diagnostic 
constellations. 
Co-morbidity within Personality Disorders, Clusters A, B, and C 
Personality disorders are among the most frequent disorders treated by psychiatrists 
(Zimmerman et al. 2005).  Estimates of those seeking outpatient treatment meeting criteria for 
one of the 10 official DSM-IV-TR personality disorders range from approximately one third to 
almost half of outpatients, taking into account patients diagnosed with PDNOS.  Panic disorder is 
associated with high rates of personality co-morbidity, estimated between 40% to 50% (Yates, 
2000).  Co-morbidity rates for being diagnosed with two or more personality disorders have 
consistently been found to be high.  According to Zimmerman et al. (2005), who evaluated 859 
psychiatric outpatients, among patients who met criteria for at least one personality disorder, 
60.4% met for more than one personality disorder and 25.2% met for two or more personality 
disorders.  The Part II NCS-R (Lenzenweger et al., 2007) also found significant comorbidity 
within cluster, using tetrachoric correlations, and the following table (Table 1) adapted from 




     
Table 1.  Correlations Among DSM-IV/IPDE PDs in the Clinical Reappraisal Sample n = 214) 
                    NCS-R IPDE Clinical Data: Tetrachoric Correlation Estimate   
                         CLUSTER A                   CLUSTER B
 b















           
    PAR            
    S’OID .77a           
    S’TYP .48 .96a          
    ANY A ---- ---- ----         
CLUSTER 
Bb 
     
      
    ANT .73a -.84a .13 .56a ----       
    BOR .76a .56a .34 .58a .64a       
    ANY B .83a .46 .27 .65a ---- ---- ----     
CLUSTER 
C 
           
    AVO .70a .55a .53a .60a .05 .54a .44     
    DEP .20 -.84a -.86a .03 -.83a .82a .77a .70a    
    OCD .59a .40 .49 .49a .45 .67a .59a .63a .80a   
    ANY C .67a .49a .46a .55a .24 .55a .45 ---- ---- ----  
Total            
    PD NOS .55 -.89a -.10 .37 .90a .55 .82a -.27 -.79a .64a .43 
NCS-R, National Comorbidity Survey Replication; PAR, paranoid; S’OID, schizoid; S’TYP, 
schizotypal; ANY A, any cluster A PD; ANT, antisocial; BOR, borderline; ANY B, any cluster B PD; 
AVO, avoidant; DEP, dependent; OCD, obsessive-compulsive disorder; ANY C, any cluster C PD. 
a Significant at the .05 level, two-sided test. 
b Note that Narcissistic and Histrionic PDs were not included in the table in the original article 
(Lenzenweger et al., 2007) 
Dividing the ten personality disorders into three clusters as discrete and separate elements 
has been examined for validity through factor analysis (Kass et al. 1985; Hyler & Lyons, 1988).  
The use of the three clusters has been consistently found to support the grouping of personality 
disorders into categories showing similar clinical characteristics. The exception to this finding 
has been obsessive-compulsive personality disorder (OCPD), as factor analytic studies have 
found it to constitute a separate component from the three clusters, despite its continued 
designation as a cluster C personality disorder (Skodol et al., 2005; Kass et al., 1985; Morey et 
al., 1986).   
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Treatment of personality disorders 
Research into psychotherapy outcomes for personality disorders has been fairly limited.  
Primarily, there have studies on the treatment of Borderline PD, with more recent examinations 
of other personality disorders, those in cluster C in particular.  According to the “Practice 
Guideline for the Treatment of Patients With Borderline Personality Disorder” (2001), two 
psychotherapeutic approaches have been shown in randomized controlled trials to have efficacy: 
psychoanalytic/psychodynamic therapy (such as Mentalization-Based Therapy (MBT)) and 
dialectical behavior therapy (DBT).  Transference Focused Psychotherapy (TFP) has also been 
studied for the treatment of individual Borderline PD and comorbid Narcissistic and Borderline 
PDs (Diamond et al., 2013).  
Svartberg et al. (2004) designed a randomized controlled trial comparing short-term 
psychodynamic psychotherapy and cognitive therapy for 40 weekly sessions for adult outpatients 
(ages 18-65 years) with cluster C personality disorders (N = 51).  54% of patients from the short-
term psychodynamic therapy group and 42% of patients from the cognitive psychotherapy group 
were considered “recovered” for psychiatric symptoms on the Global Severity Index of the SCL-
90 (Derogotis, 1983), and 40% of patients showed significant improvement in personality 
pathology in both groups.  Despite these impressive changes, a sizeable number of patients did 
not significantly improve and the authors suggested that “factors other than treatment modality 
may discriminate better between successful and poor outcomes.”  A better understanding of the 
makeup of patients with Axis I and II disorders may give information about the changes that 
patients undergo, and therefore guide further refinement of therapeutic interventions. 
One randomized control trial (Vinnars et al., 2005) compared 40 sessions of manualized 
time-limited supportive-expressive psychotherapy (SEP; Luborsky, 1984) to a nonmanualized 
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community-delivered psychodynamic treatment (CDPT) for patients with any personality 
disorder (N = 156).  The researchers found reduction of psychiatric symptoms based on the 
Symptom Checklist-90-R (SCL-90), general personality disorder severity and improvement in 
general psychosocial functioning in both treatment groups at termination and maintained at 
follow-up.  The authors accounted for severity in personality disorders on the SCID-II, by 
creating a dimensional index, summarizing all of the positive criteria on Axis II, resulting in a 
scale that ranged from 0 to 93.  In this way, they attempted to address the categorical diagnostic 
system of the SCID-II, in its use of arbitrary cutoff points for demarcation of personality 
disorders.   
 
CO-MORBIDITY OF PANIC AND PERSONALITY DISORDERS  
Several models have been proposed to describe the relationship between Axis I disorders 
and personality disorders.  Much of the longitudinal research into the interaction of personality 
disorders and Axis I best fits in the framework of the "pathoplasty" model, which does not 
assume a shared etiology, but rather emphasizes the influence of one disorder on the presentation 
or course of the other (Shea et al., 2004).  Some studies have found evidence through self-reports 
of a particular directional effect in this interaction, that is, the impact of an acute Axis I disorder 
on presentation of personality traits or disorders and vice versa (Widiger, Verheul, & van den 
Brink, 1999).   
Particularly relevant to panic disorder patients are the cluster C personality disorders.  
The personality disorders in cluster C, which includes Avoidant PD (AVPD), Dependent PD 
(DPD), and Obsessive Compulsive PD (OCPD), share a common factor of fearfulness (Fossati et 
al., 2006). For AVPD, the core fear is of negative evaluation, for DPD, the core fear is of 
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separation, and for OCPD, the fear is of not having personal and interpersonal control.  In a study 
on anxiety disorders, high rates of comorbidity between Generalized Anxiety Disorder and the 
cluster C personality disorders were found by Massion el al. (2002), AVPD: 20%, DPD: 10% 
and OCPD: 9%, as well as Social Phobia and cluster C, AVPD: 35%, DPD: 6% and OCPD: 7%.  
These are the most common PDs found for panic disorder patients (Friborg, et al., 2013).  A 
recent PsycInfo meta-analysis identified 118 papers published between 1980 and 2010 from 
English or German speaking sources with relevant criteria of primary anxiety disorders for 
patients over 18-years-old with comorbid personality disorders (Friborg et al., 2013).  The 
authors estimated that for panic disorder without agoraphobia 41% of patients met criteria for 
any comorbid PD, 14% for cluster A PDs, 16% for cluster B PDs, and 22% for cluster C PDs. 
For panic disorder with agoraphobia, 47% of patients met criteria for any comorbid PD, 11% for 
cluster A PDs, 20% for cluster B PDs, and 38% for cluster C PDs.  Proportions for specific PDs 
are below in Table 2, adapted from Friborg et al (2013): 
 




PD          
 PAR S’OID S’TYP ANT BOR HIS NAR AVO DEP OCD 
Panic no 
Agora 
.06 .04 .04 .04 .10 .11 .05 .15 .13 .09 
439 431 514 341 515 542 486 594 528 641 
9 8 9 6 11 11 9 11 11 11 
Panic 
w/Agora 
.07 .02 .02 .03 .06 .08 .05 .17 .13 .11 
1955 2001 2000 1813 2426 2612 2320 3045 2747 2694 
21 17 17 18 21 23 22 28 26 25 
 
Note: Reported data(ex:.06.) represent mean proportion of personality disorders. Total sample 
size and number of studies [ex:439 and 9] are reported on the lines immediately following. 
PAR, paranoid; S’OID, schizoid; S’TYP, schizotypal; ANT, antisocial; BOR, borderline; HIS, 
histrionic; NAR, narcissistic; AVO, avoidant; DEP, dependent; OCD, obsessive-compulsive 




     
      The impact of co-morbid Axis II disorders on the treatment of panic disorder 
Generally, five variables have been associated with poorer treatment outcome responses 
among panic disorder patients: severity of panic disorder, the presence/severity of agoraphobia, 
comorbid depression, female gender, the history of separation anxiety disorder, and the presence 
a personality disorder (Pollack et al., 2000).  Severe agoraphobia has been linked to greater 
incidence of Axis II diagnosis as well as greater levels of severity of personality pathology 
(Shear et al, 2004).  However, the nature of the relationship between severe agoraphobia and 
personality disorder is inconclusive and does not seem predictive (Brooks, Baltazar & Munjack, 
1989).  The effect of personality disorders on outcome of pharmacological treatment in patients 
with panic disorder is subject to debate in the research literature.  In a review of 
pharmacotherapy treatments for panic disorder, Slaap and den Boer (2001) concluded that 
personality disorders, or even personality traits are the most robust predictor of nonresponse. 
However, this effect has been disputed in other studies (Clair et al., 1992; Hoffman et al., 1998; 
Massion et al., 2002; Tony et al., 2000; Kampman et. al., 2008).  Of particular debate is whether 
any PD or only specific PDs negatively affect response to pharmacological treatment (Massion et 
al., 2002; Tony et al., 2000; O'Rourke et al., 1996, Berger et al., 2004).  Marchesi et al. (2006) 
suggest that different findings regarding the influence of personality disorders on the 
pharmacological treatments of panic disorder may be due to both differences in methodologies 
(self-report versus structured interview) and the duration of the periods examined in the studies.  
The negative impact of personality disorders is less likely to be found after a short-term follow-
up (less than three months) (Slaap & den Boer, 2001). Furthermore, a combination of any cluster 
C PD and the severity of panic disorder with agoraphobia has been identified as the most 
significant predictor of suicidal ideation (Starcevic et al., 1999).   
28 
 
     
In a study of 347 outpatients with a primary anxiety disorders, at least 35% were found to 
have a personality disorder, with 27% meeting criteria for a cluster C disorder (Sanderson et al., 
1994).  Patients with panic disorder and comorbid personality disorder typically have higher 
levels of panic severity.  In a treatment study of 173 patients, participants with one or more 
comorbid personality disorders displayed higher baseline and higher post CBT treatment scores 
across multiple indices of panic disorder severity compared to those without personality 
disorders (Telch, Kamphuis, and Schmidt, 2011). 
In one study isolating the effect of personality traits on treatment for panic disorder using 
two types of SSRIs, only borderline traits (based on SCID-II evaluations) had a negative impact 
on remission (Marchesi et al., 2006).  Patients were evaluated once monthly over the course of 
one year.  In this study, remission was defined as the absence of full or limited symptom panic 
attacks, anticipatory anxiety, phobic avoidance and depression for three months.  The total 
number of traits of each personality cluster did not affect outcome.  As several variables have 
been found to negatively affect treatment of panic disorder (Slaap & den Boer, 2001), the authors 
excluded the effects of female gender, age at onset, duration of disorder, pre-treatment severity 
of symptoms and Axis I comorbidity, isolating borderline traits to be a predictable variable in 
nonresponse to SSRI pharmacotherapy for panic disorder. 
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) practice guideline (2009) recommends 
psychodynamic psychotherapy for panic disorder patients with comorbid personality disorders 
based on pilot research from Milrod et al. (2007).  As coping strategies across PDs tend to be 
limited and maladaptive, patients with co-morbid Axis I disorders may have increased 
symptomatology in both severity and scope (Van Velzen & Emmelkamp, 1999). In a study 
making a three-way comparison among patients with pure anxiety disorders, patients with pure 
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depressive disorders, and patients with both anxiety and depressive disorders, prevalence rates 
for PDs were highest for the anxious/depressed group, who were diagnosed with more avoidant, 
dependent, paranoid and borderline PDs (Van Velzen & Emmelkamp, 1999).  Oldham et al. 
(1995) found that there are significant odds that when a personality disorder is present, a mood, 
anxiety, psychotic, or eating disorder is also present.  Although treatment outcomes for 
individuals with a personality disorder vary depending on PD diagnosis (Bender et al., 2001), 
generally the presence of personality disorders is a negative predictor of outcome (Reich et al., 
1993; Oldham et al., 1995).  Understanding the nature and impact of the compounding effect on 
Axis I symptoms that seems to accompany character pathology will give clinicians and 
researchers a better sense of the challenges in treating different patients. 
Co-morbidity has repeatedly been suggested to have a negative impact on treatment 
processes (Kennard et al, 2005), although this is not universal.  In order to make sense of unique 
effects of particular patterns of co-morbidity on panic treatment interventions, assessment of 
clinically significant co-occurrences will be necessary (Starcevic, 2005).  However, this type of 
study is complicated and controversial, in that there is evidence that is difficult to accurately 
evaluate a person’s long-term personality traits during an acute phase of panic disorder 
(Bienvenu & Brandes, 2005).  Panic disorder may exacerbate or exaggerate personality 
difficulties (Bienvenu & Brandes, 2005), with some evidence suggesting that high neuroticism, 
or a tendency to experience negative emotions often precedes the onset of anxiety disorders.  
However, the nature and direction of the relationship between personality difficulties and anxiety 
disorders is not fully understood, with some suggesting that the adverse effect of personality 
traits on the treatment response for panic disorder has been overstated and overgeneralized 
(Bienvenu & Brandes, 2005). 
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MENTALIZATION AND REFLECTIVE FUNCTIONING 
 The construct of mentalization is described by Peter Fonagy and colleagues (2002) as 
“the process by which we realize that having a mind mediates our experience of the world.”  
Mentalization is briefly defined as the imaginative capacity to reflect on internal experience, a 
social cognitive ability to imagine one’s own feelings and behavior and to reasonably speculate 
on the motivations and behaviors of other people (Fonagy & Target, 2006).  Fonagy posits that 
mentalization is intrinsic to the development of the self, and fundamental to human interaction. 
Mentalization is an integration of research into “theory of mind” with attachment theory and 
psychoanalytic concepts.  Fonagy has suggested that “the failure of mentalizing (social 
cognition) to be a vulnerability factor for a range of psychopathologies, particularly PDs” 
(Chiesa & Fonagy, 2013).  
Borne out of philosophical debates regarding the understanding of one’s own and others’ minds, 
theory of mind was first studied as cognitive process, a primary deficit in autism, as an inability 
to take another person’s perspective (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, Frith, 1985).  Mentalizing theory was 
initially described in the context of the formulation of mentalization-based treatment (MBT) for 
BPD in a partial hospitalization setting (Fonagy & Allison, 2014; Bateman & Fonagy, 2008; 
Bateman & Fonagy 2004).  Fonagy and colleagues (2002) expanded on the basic concept of 
theory of mind to include a range of interpersonal functions that require an appreciation of the 
emotional mind, with distinct and understandable mental states that underlie observable behavior 
(Slade, 1999; Slade, et al., 2005).  Mentalization reflects a complex affective and interpersonal 
understanding of oneself and others, and suggests capacities that enable an individual to develop 
an enriched stable sense of self and to effectively navigate the social world. 
31 
 
     
Awareness and insight into mental states allows for greater control over emotional 
experiences by creating a complex context and multiple perspectives for feelings and reactions. 
Healthy mentalization functions in the consolidation of the self, as it is critical to both identity 
development and affect regulation. Through understanding that emotions are internally generated 
rather than an externally imposed force, self-regulation becomes more available as a means for 
greater autonomy in affectively charged circumstances. The compounding benefits of this 
psychological capacity is described by Slade et al. (2005), as being able to separate what is 
internal to the self from particular contributions from the other may support “productive, 
intimate, and sustaining relationships,” capable of feeling connected to others but separate at the 
same time.  In turn, individuals with poor mentalization capacity may have weaknesses in their 
sense of a self, in their capacity to tolerate strong emotions, and in their facility to form healthy 
interpersonal relationships. 
Theoretical underpinnings of mentalization  
Although mentalization theory primarily grew out of attachment theory research, as first 
pioneered by British psychoanalyst, John Bowlby (1969, 1980), Fonagy & Allison (2014) have 
argued that the mechanism of mentalization encompasses “the developmental significance of the 
transmission of epistemic trust in relation to social learning in the attachment context.”  To 
clarify the complex and far-reaching implications of this developmental theory, each of these 
components needs to be described and explored.  Attachment theory assumes that there is a 
universal and inborn human proclivity to form close bonds with others.  In the formation of these 
bonds, attachment behaviors by an infant, such as smiling or clinging, are reciprocated by adult 
attachment behaviors, such as holding or soothing, which in turn strengthens and reinforces the 
attachment behaviors of the infant.  Sroufe (1996) suggested that the primary objective of the 
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attachment system is the experience of security, which would be, among other outcomes, a 
necessary foundation for regulating human experience.  The infant is externally regulated by his 
caregiver as he communicates changes in his state which are then understood and responded to 
by his caregiver.  The child learns that the caregiver will help him should he be aroused beyond 
his coping capabilities and will soothe and aid him in recovering.  Experiences over time with 
the caregiver are aggregated and layered into representational systems, termed “internal working 
models” by Bowlby (1973).   
Based on Bowlby’s theory, Ainsworth et al. (1978) conducted controlled studies of infant 
attachment patterns, attempting to identify these representational systems.  She developed “the 
strange situation,” in which she observed separations and reunions between mothers and their 
infants, thereby activating responses along a continuum of security and fear.  Ainsworth 
categorized infants’ responses as representing three different types of attachment patterns: 
secure, preoccupied, and avoidant. She theorized that the attachment system is triggered by fear, 
while security facilitates exploration. Secure infants feel confident in the availability and 
trustworthiness of the primary attachment figure and will therefore feel comfortable exploring. 
Ainsworth et al. (1978) emphasize the importance of this “secure base” for the infant’s 
development of his identity and his sense of his caregiver. One of the protections of secure 
attachment, according to Ainsworth, is managing the activation of the attachment system.  
Infants with preoccupied or avoidant attachment classifications, also known as insecure 
attachment, do not have efficient strategies for managing their attachment needs and therefore 
suffer from chronic activation of the attachment system.   
Expanding on Ainsworth’s theories, Main and Solomon (1990) created an additional 
category of insecure attachment, “disorganized” attachment for infants who do not seem to have 
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a coherent strategy for managing the activation of the attachment system.  These infants do not 
fit into Ainsworth’s categories of secure, avoidant or preoccupied. These children seem confused 
as to whether to approach or avoid the caregiver during times of stress, which can particularly 
occur if the caregiver is the cause of fear, making the baby’s natural impulse to seek closeness 
maladaptive (Main & Hess, 2000).  These children may exhibit behaviors such as appearing 
“dazed,” freezing, rocking, or show contradictory actions, such as approaching the caregiver but 
with their back turned.  A disorganized attachment classification has been theorized to be a risk 
factor for severe psychiatric disturbances in childhood and adulthood, particularly borderline 
personality disorder (Fonagy et al., 1996; Homes 2004; Nakash-Eisikovits, Dutra & Westen, 
2002).  Main and Goldwyn (1994; 1995) developed the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) to 
classify the attachment of adults, asking about the subject’s early relationships with the important 
caregivers. 
Critical to the development of mentalization is the construction of an increasingly 
sophisticated sense of self through emergent levels of agency in the context of the relationship 
with one’s primary caregiver (Slade, 2005).  In this model (2002), the development of the self 
requires early differentiated physical representation, social affective-communicative interactions, 
basic and then more complex understanding of goal-directed rational intentionality, and the 
development of abstraction and temporality, allowing for the emergence of an “autobiographical 
self.” These cognitive, psychological, and developmental lines are considered normal, with a 
spectrum of psychopathology arising from the developmental distortion of the self as agent.   
The Reflective Function Scale 
The Reflective Function (RF) scale is an operationalized measurement of the set of 
mental actions behind mentalization. Fonagy et al., (1998) developed an RF scoring system for 
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use with the AAI to assess a person’s capacity to understand mental states in themselves or 
others.  Fonagy and colleagues found that a mother’s capacity to reflect on her own parents is 
correlated to her child’s attachment classification and her attachment style.  In other words, 
mothers with high RF scores were more likely to be classified as secure and more likely to have 
children classified as secure than mothers with low RF scores (Fonagy et al., 1995; Fonagy et al., 
1998).   They hypothesized that a mother’s capacity to understand and make meaning of her 
child’s mental states functions critically in her child’s emotional development, as the child learns 
about mental states by having his own mind reflected back to him by his mother (Fonagy et al., 
2002). The mother’s capacity to mentalize makes her child’s and her own behavior fairly 
predictable.  This process serves to engender a feeling of security for the child and supports his 
growing sense of self and his ability to feel able to manage his emotional experience. 
Slade and colleagues (2005) conducted research following Fonagy’s hypothesis that RF 
mediates the intergenerational transmission of attachment status.  They adapted an RF scoring 
system for use with the Parent Development Interview (PDI), a semi-structured interview that 
specifically assesses the mother’s representation of her child (Slade et al., 2004).  In a sample of 
40 mothers with babies, Slade and colleagues demonstrated that maternal RF is significantly 
related to infant attachment status.  Their results supported the idea that maternal reflective 
function mediates the relationship between the mother’s attachment and the infant’s attachment.  
The mother’s ability to transmit both attachment security and capacity for RF inextricably 
influences the child’s social and emotional development. 
However, Fonagy has recently changed focus on the use of attachment in the 
development of mentalization, citing the theory of natural pedagogy, developed by Csibra and 
Gergley (2009) to explain how attachment history creates distinct epistemic states, or conditions 
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for communication of interpersonal and intrapersonal knowledge.  In this theory, human 
communication is primarily an evolutionary imperative, required for the transmission of 
cognitively opaque cultural knowledge.  Ostensive cues trigger a special mode of learning in the 
infant, in which the child feels that the subsequent communication will contain information that 
is specifically relevant that is encoded with other knowledge relevant to social situations.  A 
securely attached child will believe that his/her caregiver is a reliable source of knowledge 
because of this history of communication, in part through consistent emotional responses (Csibra 
& Gergley, 2011.  Fonagy and Allison (2014) have more recently argued that: 
although attachment may be a key mechanism for mediating 
epistemic trust, it is secondary to an underlying biological process 
preserved by evolution. In other words, secure attachment is 
unlikely to be necessary for generating epistemic trust but it may 
be sufficient to do so, and, further, it is the most pervasive 
mechanism in early childhood because it is a highly evolutionarily 
effective indicator of trustworthiness (Fonagy & Allison, 2014, p. 
374).   
As demonstrated by Fonagy and colleagues during the development of the RF scoring 
system (Fonagy et al., 1991), there is a wide range in the capacity of individuals to mentalize.  
As currently theorized, this spectrum is a result of the individual differences in the early dyadic 
relationship of mother and infant.  Disruptions in the attachment relationship, regardless of the 
reason, may hinder the development of mentalization in the child.  As mentalization is posited to 
be fundamental in the development of the sense of self and in self-regulation, impairment of this 
capacity will disrupt the developing capacity for object relations and affect regulation (Fonagy et 
al., 2002; Slade et al., 2005; Fonagy & Target, 2006).   
During normal development, the infant develops an awareness of himself as a separate 
self through communication with significant caregivers. This process begins with 
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communication of physical needs, which begins to consolidate the infant’s physical self.  
Through the mother’s early mirroring of the infant’s responses, the child develops a basic 
emotional self.  The infant learns to recognize that the mother’s mirroring reflects something that 
comes from within.  Fonagy and colleagues (2002) emphasize the importance of “high but 
imperfect contingencies” as a kind of mirroring that supports the healthy development of affect 
recognition and regulation.  The mother mirrors the child in such a way that is slightly modified 
and elaborated on the emotions of the child.  In this way, the mother “marks” the emotion and 
communicates that the mother understands and empathizes with the child’s emotions (Bateman 
& Fonagy, 2004).   
In presenting a slightly altered and heightened version of the emotion, the child moves 
toward a second order representation of affect, building on a cognitive appraisal component.  The 
parent allows the child to develop a secondary representation of primary affect states, as the 
parent communicates a metabolized version of the affect.  This exaggerated version, mirrored to 
the child should be experienced by the child as a representation of the child’s affect and not the 
affect itself, allowing the child to differentiate his own affect from the parent’s affect.  This 
process ultimately teaches the child to recognize affect that is internally generated as distinct 
from the affect of others (Fonagy et al., 2002).  Fonagy and colleagues refer to the experience of 
anxiety specifically, as a “confusing mixture of physiological changes, ideas and behaviors.”  
The mother organizes the child’s experience by reflecting back the child’s anxiety so he knows 
what he is feeling.  These interactions between mother and child organize different internal states 
in knowable and containable mental states. The mother’s representation of the child’s affect is 
assumed by the child and is “mapped onto the representation of his self-state.”  These different 
self-states consolidate into a sense of self. 
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Direct reflection on the part of the mother that too literally mirrors the child’s emotion 
without marking it is experienced as the caregiver’s affect, not the infant’s. Inaccurate reflection, 
direct reflection, or an absence of reflection may work to keep the baby’s feelings unsymbolized, 
and therefore confusing, perhaps uncontainable and even frightening.  Bateman and Fonagy 
(2004) further hypothesize that if the caregiver does not appropriately mirror the child’s affects, 
the child is deprived of the feeling of being known, which can interrupt the process of self-object 
differentiation.  The experience of being safe with one’s feelings allows the child to feel capable 
of being regulated. Chronic experiences of being “unknown, obliterated or dysregulated create 
feelings of danger, insecurity or falseness and unreality” (Slade, 2002, p. 2). 
When the mother is unable to reflect affect to the infant, creating an emotional scaffold 
for the child, the earliest stages of self development are disrupted.  Often parents who are unable 
to facilitate this process have deficits or disruptions in mentalization, whether due to interfering 
illness or due to their own childhood trauma and are unable to regulate their own strong 
emotions, and may expose their children to abuse or volatile environments.  As a result the child 
is not supplied with an important psychological protective tool and is burdened with greater 
emotional trauma.  If the child feels that his own mind or the mind of the caregiver is 
overwhelming or otherwise intolerable, the child may actively avoid reflection as it is too 
threatening.  In this way, a deficit in mentalization is a developmental failure but also represents 
a defense against unbearable feelings. 
Fonagy and Bateman (2006) describe the relationship between mentalization and affect 
regulation as a mutually influencing process that influences and shapes the formation of healthy 
self-object representations.  They suggest that an individual who is constitutionally vulnerable 
who then experiences developmental trauma will have an unstable representation of self.  In an 
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attempt to cope with this destabilization, the individual will rely on early psychological 
mechanisms, such as primitive defenses, to organize emotional experiences. This type of 
disturbance impedes emotional development, as what Fonagy and Target (2006) term the 
mentalizing self is critical to increasingly sophisticated types of affect regulation. They note that 
rudimentary affect regulation is a prelude and required for the development of mentalization, but 
once mentalization occurs, the capacity for and nature of affect regulations expands.  
Mentalization supports the transformation of affect states, and more importantly, is used to 
regulate the self, as the “child’s capacity to create a coherent image of mind depends on an 
experience of being perceived as a mind by the attachment figure” (p. 554, Fonagy & Target, 
2006).  The infant’s capacity to self-soothe evolves into the ability to keep a stable sense of self 
and use this stability in supporting emotion regulation. 
 As Fonagy and Target (2006) hypothesize, in order for mentalization to fully develop, 
the child needs the attachment system to not be regularly activated.  The dysregulation and 
arousal created by the activation of the attachment system does not allow the child to have the 
emotional or cognitive space to make sense of the world or richly develop the concept of mind.  
An insecurely attached child bears a more chronic state of hyperarousal, and as a result, may 
expend emotional resources to self regulate and make sense of an unpredictable caregiver, not 
leaving sufficient reserves to develop a mentalizing self, in reflecting on or making meaning of 
reality. A childhood environment which most supports the development of mentalization should 
also support the child’s ability to explore, play, learn, and freely understand himself in a safe 
environment.  In this way, the environment that produces mentalization, as well as the 
subsequent healthy mentalization itself play a crucial role in the consolidation of the self, critical 
to identity development and affect regulation, allowing for more effective coping in the face of 
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stress.  Individuals with lower mentalization capacity may have serious disturbances in their 
sense of self and ability to manage strong emotions, which may, in turn, interfere with 
interpersonal relationships. 
Lower RF scores have been found to be correlated to borderline personality disorder 
(BPD) and other psychiatric difficulties.  In a study of 82 inpatients, patients with a diagnosis of 
BPD were significantly more likely to have low RF scores than average or above average RF 
scores (Fonagy et al., 1996; Fonagy et al., 1998).  Fonagy and colleagues’ theorize that 
underlying much of the pathology of BPD is a failure to symbolize affect states in the context of 
attachment relationships (Fonagy et al., 2002; Bateman & Fonagy 2004), which would be 
represented in a failure to mentalize.  Bateman and Fonagy assume this skill was underdeveloped 
or fails because the child did not experience effective marking and contingent mirroring, and 
therefore did not learn to distinguish between the caregiver’s affect state and his own state.  Even 
if the affect state reflected to child by the parent does not match with the child’s affective 
experience, the child may still internalize these representations, including identifications of the 
self as bad or destructive, creating an “alien self.”  According to Bateman and Fonagy (2004), as 
adults, patients with BPD struggle to view themselves and others as separate beings and either 
merge with good aspects of the other, or project these alien aspects of self on to the other, in 
order to create and maintain a sense of continuity within the self.  In addition, patients with BPD 
actively, defensively inhibit thinking about the mental states of self and others, as “these 
experiences have led them to experiences of unbearable pain.” Chiesa and Fonagy (2013) found 
that lower RF scores were associated with both childhood adversity, defined as abuse and 
neglect, and PDs.  As mentalization becomes protective during times of stress, individuals with 
deficits in mentalization will be comparatively further destabilized by stress.  Inhibition of 
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mentalization may be adaptive in an abusive child-parent relationship, as sharing a mind with 
disturbed and abusive parent can be destabilizing.  However, this adaptive defense also results in 
an ego weakness, leaving patients with BPD more prone to emotional lability and poor coping 
strategies. Lacking the ability to create a secondary representation of affect states, patients with 
impairments in RF may act out as both a failure in affect regulation and for the purpose of 
expressing internal states.  When RF is not impaired, it serves as a resource to protect against 
trauma related emotional difficulties. 
Reflective Function, symptomatology and psychotherapy  
Choi-Kain and Gunderson (2008) compared mentalization to similar concepts such as 
empathy, mindfulness, psychological mindedness, and affect consciousness. When comparing 
these five concepts, they did find conceptual distinctions across dimensional dichotomies of 
implicit and explicit modes of mentalizing, the facility of self-oriented mentalization versus 
other-oriented mentalization, and the integration of cognitive-affective aspects of both process 
and content of understanding mental states.  In the Handbook of Menatlizing in Mental Health 
Practice (2012), Bateman, Fonagy and Luyten emphasize differences in the self- versus other-
oriented mentalization.  These differences may manifest in three possible forms: impaired 
mentalizing about both the self and others; marked imbalances in mentalizing about the self and 
other; and imbalances in different way of mentalizing about the self and others.  
As a caveat to the expanding inquiry into the utility of RF in the development of effective 
treatments, Choi-Kain and Gunderson (2008) emphasize that the validity of the RF measure is 
underdeveloped.  Furthermore, they suggest that a deeper understanding of the relationship of RF 
to borderline personality disorder and other diagnostic groups would elucidate the concept and 
usefulness in treatment development.  RF has been investigated in outcome research studies for 
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the treatment of borderline personality disorder (Levy et al., 2006; Yoemans et al., 2008; 
Bateman & Fonagy, 2008; Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). Although mentalizing theory was 
developed within the context of the formulation of mentalization-based treatment (MBT), 
Fonagy & Allison (2014) have argued that MBT has grown into a comprehensive approach to 
the understanding and treatment of personality disorder more broadly across clinical settings.  
Further, they posit that mentalization may be usefully described as a “common factor across 
different forms of effective psychotherapy.  
Levy and colleagues (2006) assessed the changes in attachment organization and 
reflective function for three types of year-long psychotherapy treatments for BPD: transference-
focused psychotherapy (TFP), dialectical behavior therapy (DBT) and a modified 
psychodynamic supportive psychotherapy.  Significant improvements in RF and narrative 
coherence were observed in patients treated with TFP, changes not found for other treatment 
conditions. In an earlier paper from the same study, Clarkin et al, (2006) found that TFP was 
related to reductions in aggression, as well as depression, anxiety, anger and suicidality. 
However, the nature of the relationship between RF and these symptoms is an understudied 
aspect of clinical research.  The study of RF within the context of clinical trials might give 
insight into differences among people with various symptoms in combination with personality.  
 Fischer-Kern and colleagues (2010) examined the relationship between personality 
organization, using the Structured Interview of Personality Organization (STIPO; Clarkin et al., 
2004), RF, using the Adult Attachment Interview, and the number of Axis I or Axis II diagnoses 
in a sample of 92 female borderline outpatients.  The STIPO is a semistructured version of 
Kernberg’s clinical Structural Interview (1984).  It examines seven dimensions of personality 
functioning: identity consolidation, quality of object relations, use of primitive defenses, 
42 
 
     
character rigidity versus adaptive coping, quality of aggression, moral values and reality testing. 
Each dimension is derived from a question-based scoring method, with clinical ratings for each 
dimension ranging from absence of pathology to very severe pathology. Furthermore, an 
assessment of the level of personality organization, normal, neurotic (neurotic 1 or 2), or 
borderline (borderline 1 to 3) is made.  Thus, descriptors of borderline 1, 2 or 3 refer to different 
levels of personality organization.  They found significant correlations between level of 
personality organization and number of Axis I or Axis II disorders and a moderate association 
between RF and level of personality organization.  However, they found no association between 
the number of Axis I or Axis II disorders and RF.  This finding was in contrast to an earlier study 
by these researchers (Bouchard et al., 2008), which showed lower levels of mentalization to be 
significantly associated with the severity of both Axis I and Axis II pathology in a heterogeneous 
clinical and nonclinical sample.   
As noted above, other than studies on borderline personality disorder, literature on the 
relationship between RF and psychopathology is sparse.  Fischer-Kern and colleagues have 
conducted two studies examining the relationship between Axis I disorders and RF (Fischer-
Kern et al, 2013; Fischer-Kern et al, 2010).  In a study of 46 inpatients with major depressive 
disorder, RF was scored using the AAI, and compared with that of 20 “healthy” controls.  The 
authors found highly impaired RF in severe chronically depressed inpatients as compared to the 
controls.  Furthermore, patients with comorbid depression and dependent personality disorder 
had higher RF scores than those with depression alone, while those with comorbid depression 
and schizoid personality disorder had lower RF scores than those with depression only (Fischer-
Kern et al., 2013).  Ward et al (2001) observed a lower level of general RF in 20 inpatients with 
anorexia nervosa in comparison to a healthy control group.  These findings may also be 
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considered consistent with research by Rastam et al. (1997) observed a subset of anorectic 
patients that may have difficulty identifying and communicating feeling states, although they 
used a measure of alexithymia to characterize this group.   
A study by Rudden, Milrod, Target, Ackerman, and Graf (2006) noted that RF in 49 
panic disorder patients was not impaired. However, Rudden et al. (2006) also measured Panic-
Specific RF (PSRF), a scale derived from semistructured interview to elicit the patients’ 
understanding of the connection between aspects of their inner lives and their symptoms, 
analogous to general RF yet targeting preoccupying symptoms.  The authors found that mean 
PSRF scores were significantly lower than mean general RF scores, signifying that the patients 
were not impaired overall in their measured ability to mentalize, but were impaired with regard 
to reflection on their panic symptoms.   
Bouchard et al. (2008) investigated the relationship between various measures of 
mentalization, attachment status and the severity of Axis I and II pathology. Twenty-two 
participants were assessed for Axis I and II diagnoses using the SCID-I and SCID-II and RF 
using the AAI. Using hierarchical multiple regression, RF was shown to be associated with the 
number of Axis I and II diagnoses, as well as their severity in a mixed sample of both clinical 
and non-clinical populations. Lower RF was associated with greater severity of both Axis I and 
II pathology, particularly among patients with primary Axis II disorders. In a sample of 24 
female inpatients, Muёller et al. (2006) assessed RF and used the “structure” Axis of the 
operationalized psychodynamic diagnosis (OPD; OPD Task Force, 2001) as a measure of 
personality.  The OPD concept of “structure” closely relates to Kernberg’s model of personality 
organization and is assessed on six dimensions (self-perception, self-regulation, defense, object 
perception, communication, and attachment). The authors found a high positive correlation 
44 
 
     
between “structure” and RF in a mixed clinical sample.  However, the power of RF to predict 
positive therapy outcome was largely independent of its relationship to this Axis on the OPD. 
 
Current study 
This study will investigate the relationship between reflective functioning and personality 
disorders in patients with primary DSM-IV-TR panic disorder with or without agoraphobia.  The 
intention of this research is to delineate and clarify differences among patients with an Axis I 
disorder through classifications of personality disorders, particularly the clusters.  The 
investigation of underlying and defining characteristics within comorbidity is central to making 
accurate and useful diagnosis and subsequent treatment planning and evaluation of treatment 
response.  Pinpointing factors in symptomatology that distinguish patient factors that may affect 
the treatment of their symptoms may have important implications with regard to treatment 
planning.  Distinctions in RF, if found, may suggest an approach to cataloging comorbid 
symptomatology, specifically panic disorder and personality disorders.    
Aim 1 
To examine the relationship between Reflective Functioning (RF) and axis II disorders in 
patients with primary DSM-IV panic disorder with or without agoraphobia.  
 Hypotheses 
1. The presence of any personality disorder, as diagnosed by the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders (SCID-II) will predict lower RF 
scores.   
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2. The presence of any cluster B disorder will predict lower RF scores.  This will be 
evaluated through the main effect of the presence of cluster B on RF scores in a general 
linear model (see further explanation in Methods below).   
3. The presence of any cluster B disorder will moderate the relationship of clusters A and C 
with regard to RF score.  Specifically, the presence of cluster B will correspond to lower 
RF scores overall (as stated in hypothesis 2) but when compared to cluster A will result in 
a relatively flatter slope.  That is, those subjects with both clusters A and B will have 
lower RF scores than any other combination of personality disorder cluster.  To 
demonstrate what this relationship would look like this hypothesized interaction is 
represented in Graph 1. 











No B Yes B
No A, No C
No A, Yes C









     
CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
Subjects 
This study will examine data collected as part of a larger, National Institute of Mental 
Health (NIMH) funded study, “Dynamic therapy vs. CBT for Panic Disorder,” conducted by PIs 
Barbara Milrod, MD, at the Weill Cornell Medical College, and Jacques Barber PhD at the 
University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine.  All data were collected between 2006 and 
2011. The study was approved by the IRBs of Weill Cornell Medical College and University of 
Pennsylvania School of Medicine.  Significant between-site baseline differences were found in 
some diagnostic criteria that are relevant to this study, specifically, severity of panic disorder as 
measured by the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV Lifetime Version (ADIS-
IV).  Additionally, differences were found across a number of demographic variables and 
number of stable medications patients used throughout the course of the treatments.  For the 
purpose of this dissertation, only data from one site, Weill Cornell Medical College, will be used.  
All research assessments used for the current analysis were carried out at New York Presbyterian 
Hospital-Weill Cornell Medical College, New York, NY 10065. 
Procedures 
Assessments: 
Subjects with primary DSM-IV-TR panic disorder with or without agoraphobia were 
recruited through IRB approved advertisements in local newspapers, through fliers, and 
physician referrals.  Initially, respondents were interviewed in a preliminary telephone screening 
consisting of questions related to the individual's current symptoms and functioning.  Subjects 
who seemed appropriate for the study after the initial screening were invited to participate in a 
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comprehensive evaluation, conducted over two or more sessions.  All participants signed written, 
informed consent.   
Subjects were included in the study if they were between ages 18-70 and diagnosed with 
primary DSM-IV-TR panic disorder with or without agoraphobia on the Anxiety Disorders 
Interview Schedule for DSM-IV Lifetime Version (ADIS-IV) (Dinardo, Brown, & Barlow, 
1995). Subjects were assigned diagnostic severity ratings on the ADIS, with a range of 0-8. In 
order to meet inclusion criteria for the study, subjects had panic disorder severity rating of equal 
to or greater than 4.  Subjects were excluded from the study if they had a lifetime history of any 
psychotic disorder, bipolar disorder, if they met criteria for active substance dependence (6 
months remission necessary), had an organic mental disorder, or were actively suicidal.  Data 
from 99 patients at Cornell were used based on these criteria.  
Blinded, independent research diagnosticians administered questionnaires evaluating a 
range of symptoms and psychosocial functioning, including work, family, friends and romantic 
relationships.  All evaluations were conducted by master’s level diagnosticians with at least 35 
hours of training on the ADIS-IV-L and at least 12 hours of training on symptom measures.  
Diagnosticians also received training on conducting the RF and PSRF interview by Dr. Rudden, 
and administration of the RF and PSRF interview was monitored by ongoing supervision 
throughout the study.  Patients filled out multiple self-reports.  Only those measures relevant to 
the present analysis are outlined below:   
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV Lifetime Version (ADIS-IV) (Dinardo, 
Brown, & Barlow, 1995). The ADIS is a semi-structured diagnostic interview that focuses in 
extreme detail on diagnosis among the anxiety disorders. The ADIS assesses current mood, 
somatoform and substance abuse and dependence disorders, and screens for psychotic and 
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conversion symptoms. Subjects are rated on a 9-point severity scale ranging from 0 (absent) to 8 
(most severe case).  A score of 4 corresponds to meeting DSM IV diagnostic criteria for a given 
disorder. 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders (SCID-II). (First, 
Gibbon, Spitzer & Williams, 1997). The SCID-II, as used in this study, employs the SCID-II 
interview, covering the eleven DSM-IV personality disorders (including PD NOS) and the 
categories of depressive and passive-aggressive personality disorders, and a Personality 
Questionnaire, a screening tool consisting of 'yes' and 'no' answers, that shortens the interview by 
allowing the clinician to inquire only about positive answers.  Scores on individual items are 
rated as a 1 (absent or false), 2 (subthreshhold), or 3 (threshold or true).  Only scores of 3 are 
counted as meeting criteria for each individual personality disorder, the number of which vary 
depending on disorder.   
Reflective Functioning interview (RF) (Rudden, Milrod, Target, Ackerman, & Graf, 
2006). The Reflective Functioning interview is a semi-structured interview, an abbreviated form 
of the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) (Main & Goldwyn, 1994). The AAI focuses on 
individuals’ early relationships with early caregivers.  It specifically inquires about experiences 
of separations and reunions and reflections regarding the course of the relationship over time, 
asking for the person's best understanding and explanation of parents' behavior. Using the AAI, 
Fonagy et al. (1998) identified a subset of questions that specifically "demand" reflection, 
applying the AAI Reflective Functioning scoring system to these particular questions in the 
course of the administration of the entire interview.  Mary Target and her colleagues constructed 
a semi-structured interview comprised only of these “demand” questions, including asking about 
only one parent.  The group achieved moderate reliability on this interview (ICC = 0.68, 
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Spearman). This adaptation was employed in an attempt to make RF evaluations less time-
consuming so it can be incorporated in the context of psychiatric outcome research, as the 
inclusion of the entire AAI would make the assessment unreasonably burdensome.   
Reflective Functioning is scored on an 11-point scale that evaluates the quality of 
mentalization in the context of attachment relationships.  Scores range from -1 to 9.  A score of -
1, categorized as negative RF, represents a complete repudiation of reflection, barren of 
mentalization with a bizarre distortion of the mental states of others.  A score of 5 describes 
average reflective functioning, in which an individual demonstrates a basic capacity to link 
underlying mental states to behaviors.  A score of 9 is considered exceptional RF, as the subject 
offers a complex, elaborate or vivid explanation of his or her parent's mental states, taking into 
account variations in perspective and allowing for conflictual experiences and the changing 
effects of time.   
Although the RF Scale (Fonagy et al., 1998) was developed for use with the AAI, Fonagy 
et al. (1993) also discussed the scale's potential use in other narrative interviews. Rudden and 
colleagues piloted this adaptation as part of a sub-study specifically looking at patients diagnosed 
with panic disorder.  Rudden was trained in RF scoring on the AAI by Mary Target and she 
achieved moderate reliability (ICC of 0.68, Spearmen Brown's two way mixed effect model).  
Rudden subsequently trained two raters on scoring the abbreviated RF interview, Barbara Milrod 
and Elizabeth Graf and achieved excellent reliability, determining average ICCs on the RF 






     
Data Analysis Plan 
A general linear model will be used to test the mean differences on RF for 7 possible 
interactions.  These interactions will be comprised of 7 possible combinations of personality 
disorders using the 3 clusters of PDs as defined by the DSM-IV-TR:  
One-way interactions: 
1. Presence or absence of cluster A personality disorder  
2. Presence or absence of cluster B personality disorder 
3. Presence or absence of cluster C personality disorder  
Two-way interactions: 
4. Presence or absence of a cluster A personality disorder and a cluster B personality disorder  
5. Presence or absence of a cluster B personality disorder and a cluster C personality disorder  
6. Presence or absence of a cluster A personality disorder and a cluster C personality disorder 
Three-way interaction 
7. Presence or absence of a cluster A personality disorder, a cluster B personality disorder, and a 
cluster C personality disorder.   
 
In order to find significant results, the study design must meet requirements to minimize the 
probability of committing a Type II error and not finding a relationship between RF and category 
of Axis II if it does indeed exist.  Therefore, a minimum sample size will be needed for adequate 
power.  In this case, despite low Ns expected in each category, retrospective power analysis 
showed that if differences between the means of RF are as predicted, there is adequate power 




     
CHAPTER 4: QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
Sample Characteristics 
The data for this project originated from a two site study, at The University of 
Pennsylvania Center for Psychotherapy Research and New York Presbyterian Hospital-Weill 
Cornell Medical College.  As noted above, this study is based only on the baseline visits of the 
Weill Cornell Medical College sample, N = 99.  29 subjects were men (29.3%) and 70 were 
women (69.7%). The subjects had a mean age of 41.48 years (SD = 13.521).  65.7% identified 
themselves as Caucasian, 25.3% African American, 5% Asian, 1% Native American, and 2% 
mixed or other race, with 22% of subjects identifying as Hispanic.    
 
Due to the presence of significant comorbidity in personality disorder diagnoses in this 
sample, in which a simple summary of clusters would not accurately represent the diversity of 
diagnoses in this sample, they will be described in multiple configurations.  The purpose of 
presenting these different configurations is to give a multi-dimensional picture of this sample.  
At baseline, by DSM-IV-TR criteria, assessed using the SCID-II, 45 of 99 subjects did not meet 
criteria for any personality disorder (45%), 2 subjects met criteria for PD NOS (2%), and 5 
subjects met criteria for only Depressive PD (5%). The following subjects may also have 
Depressive or Passive Aggressive PDs (from Appendix B of the DSM-IV-TR) and are listed in 
the following table, but are otherwise not an organizing characteristic (as they come from the 
Appendix) and are not taken into consideration in analysis of the data. Table 3 below lists all 
other PD by DSM categories.   
 




Table 3: Personality disorders of subjects, listed by number of PDs 
 ONE PERSONALITY DISORDER    TWO PERSONAITY DISORDERS  
 Not Otherwise Specified* 2 Cluster C only OCPD & Avoidant  2 
 Depressive only* 5  OCPD & Dependent  1 
    Avoidant & Dependent  1 
Cluster A Paranoid only 3    
   Clusters A & B Paranoid & Borderline  1 
Cluster B Narcissistic only 2    
   Clusters A & C Paranoid & OCPD 3 
Cluster C OCPD only 14  Paranoid & Avoidant 2 
 Avoidant  only 3  Paranoid & Dependent 1 
 Dependent only 1    
TOTAL w/1 PD  23 Clusters B & C Narcissistic & OCPD 2 
    Borderline & Dependent 1 
    Borderline & OCPD 1 
 THREE OR MORE PERSONALITY 
DISORDERS 
 TOTAL w/2 PD  15 
Cluster C only Avoidant, Dependent & OCPD 1    
      
Cluster A & C only  Paranoid, Avoidant & OCPD  4    
 Paranoid, Avoidant, Dependent & OCPD  1 Totals  Any personality disorder 54 
    Did not meet full criteria for any personality disorder 45 
Cluster B & C only Borderline, Avoidant & OCPD 1    
   Sample total (n)  99 
Cluster A, B & C Paranoid, Borderline & Dependent 1    
 Paranoid, Narcissistic & OCPD 1 TOTAL (n) PD (excluding NOS and Depressive PD only) 47 
TOTAL W/3+ PD  9    
      
    *not included in analysis or in total of 1 PD column  
    OCPD = Obsessive Compulsive PD  
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This study examined the relationship between the presence and interactions of the three 
different personality clusters, the following table (Table 4) shows the number of people who 
were identified with a personality disorder in each cluster.  Individuals may be counted in more 
than one cluster due to comorbidity. 
Table 4:  Presence of personality disorder by cluster 
 
 N 
A No  82 
Yes 17 
B No 89 
Yes 10 





(excluding NOS and 
depressive PD only)  
47 
 
The cluster A group was comprised only of patients with paranoid PD, with no schizoid 
or schizotypal personality disordered patients.  The cluster B group included borderline PD and 
narcissistic PD, with no antisocial or histrionic personality disordered patients.  As Table 3 and 
Table 4 demonstrate, unsurprisingly, this sample is heavily weighted toward Cluster C, the 
“anxious/fearful” personality disorders, and overall OCPD was the most common personality 
disorder.  There are three fold more cluster C personality disorders as there are cluster A or 
cluster B.  This will be taken into account in the general linear model in Table 9. 




     
Table 5: Summary of reflective function scores 
 RF 
scores Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 2.0 4 4.0 4.0 
 2.5 9 9.1 13.1 
 3.0 13 13.1 26.3 
 3.5 8 8.1 34.3 
 4.0 21 21.2 55.6 
 4.5 3 3.0 58.6 
 5.0 16 16.2 74.7 
 5.5 7 7.1                    81.8 
 6.0 10 10.1 91.9 
 6.5 2 2.0 93.9 
 7.0 4 4.0 98.0 
 7.5 2 2.0 100.0 
Total  99 100.0  
Mean 4.34    
Median 4.0    
Missing  0   
Total  99   
 
The table below (Table 6) lists the average RF scores by each combination of personality 
disorder category, although it should be noted that this comparison is condensed from the full list 
of all possible interactions used for the general linear model (GLM) to detect interactions.  
Rather, Table 6 is meant to grossly summarize the respective RF of each possible combination 
and distinct category of personality disorder by cluster.  The following categories are 
distinguished: cluster A only, cluster B only, cluster C only, clusters A and B (no C), clusters A 





     
Table 6: Mean RF for personality disorders categorized by cluster 
 
PD Category N Mean RF SD 
No A, B or C PD 45 4.37 1.39 
Cluster A only 3 4.67 2.52 
Cluster B only 2 5.25 1.06 
Cluster C only 23 4.24 1.45 
Cluster AB 1 2.50 -
1.15 
Cluster AC 11 4.46 1.08 
Cluster BC 5 3.70 .20 
Cluster ABC 2 5.25 0.35 
 
Total 92 4.34 1.38 
NOS and Depressive PD only 7   
 
Total 99   
  
 
Relationship between RF and PD 
The first analysis broadly examines if there is any relationship between the presence of 
any PD and RF score.   
Table 7: RF scores comparing no PD to any PD 
 
Table 8:  Independent T test of yes PD versus no PD for RF scores 
 
Group Statistics 
44 4.205 1.3177 .1986 




Reflective function score 
N Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Independent Samples Test 
-.872 94.891 -.2409 .2762 -.7892 .3074 
Reflective function score 
F Sig. 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 




Difference Lower Upper 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
Equal variances assumed .899 .345 -.865 97 
.385 
.389 -.2409 .2786 -.7938 .3120 
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The mean RF scores do not differ between subjects with PD and those without PD, with 
no significance differences found.   In sum, although there may be an interaction between the 
cluster of PD and RF, this analysis was not able to find a predictable model.  This is most likely 
due to a minimal effect.  However, with a larger sample size, it is possible that the nature of the 
interaction could be detected.  The implications of these findings will be discussed below.   
A general linear model (GLM) was used to take into account all possible combinations of 
cluster A, B, and C personality disorders, with regard to RF means.  The results are in Table 9. 
Table 9:  Test for relationship between reflective function and personality disorder  
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 



















 7 1.354 0.700 .672 .051 .286 
Intercept 441.069 1 441.069 228.14 .000 .715 1.000 
A 0.174 1 0.174 .090 .765 .001 .060 
B 0.392 1 0.392 .203 .654 .002 .073 
C 0.276 1 0.276 .143 .706 .002 .066 
A * B 1.097 1 1.097 .567 .453 .006 .116 
A * C 6.609 1 6.609 3.419 .068 .036 .448 
B * C 0.881 1 0.881 .456 .501 .005 .102 
A * B * C 7.159 1 7.159 3.703 .057 .039 .478 
Error 175.936 91 1.933     
Total 2048.750 99      
Corrected Total 185.414 98      
a. R Squared = .051 (Adjusted R Squared = -.022) 
b. Computed using alpha = .050 
 
 As seen under the column above entitled ‘Observed Power,’ the available power to 
detect any of the three main effects, any of the two-way interactions or the three-way interaction 
are well below conventionally accepted standards, i.e., power = .80.  Applying a Bonferroni 
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correction, the significance level would be p = 0.007 (versus using the standard probability level 
of 0.05).  If strictly using significance testing, this study would meet those conditions.  However, 
a statistical argument can be made that, while using a Bonferroni correction is necessary for 
experimental designs, doing so for nonexperimental designs (such as this study) is not imperative 
or appropriate (Garson, 2012).  For this study, the data are essentially analyzed in a survey 
context, as this sample was not recruited for random assignment to different conditions (unlike 
the larger treatment study from which these data are drawn).  In an experimental design, the goal 
is to draw valid statistical inferences for the purposes of internal validity, such as to examine the 
effects of an experimental treatment.  Nonexperiemental studies such as this are designed for 
external (rather than internal) validity; that is, the purpose of this study is to attempt to validly 
generalize any findings to a larger population, in this case, patients with panic disorder, with 
personality disorders.  In this context, the sample is not a probability sample, but rather 
considered a convenience sample, or non-random sample (Garson, 2012, p21).  Under these 
conditions, significance tests are less meaningful, both statistically and generally, than examining 
effect sizes.  Using the test for significance, these findings indicate no significant interactions 
between the clusters of A, B and C and RF scores but that there may be a trend towards a three-
way interaction, as p = 0.057.  
The column entitled ‘Partial Eta Squared’ in Table 7 calculates the proportion of the 
variability attributable to an effect of the interaction between clusters A, B, and C has to predict 
RF scores. This is described as the effect size; in this case, the interaction of clusters A, B and C 
has an effect size of η²partial = 0.039.  In other words, the effect of the interaction accounts for 
3.9% of the outcome (in this case the RF score) plus associated calculated error.  Partial eta 
squared equals 0.036 for the two-way interaction of clusters A and C.  This is a small effect size, 
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as generally small effects using partial eta squared are estimated at 0.01, medium effects at 0.06, 
and large effects at 0.14 (Miles & Shevlin, 2012; Cohen et al., 2003).  This model suggests that a 
small interaction may exist between two variables determined by the presence of a third variable.   
The amount of the effect on this three way interaction is considered small.  Note that in 
Table 9, this effect size equals 0.039 for the three way interaction for all three clusters (the same 
effect when covariance is not taken into consideration).  In this case, there are three possibilities: 
1) that there are different possible interactions between cluster A and B (and outcome of RF), 
which vary with the presence or absence of cluster C; 2) that there are different possible 
interactions between cluster A and C (and outcome of RF), which vary with the presence or 
absence of cluster B; or 3) that there are different possible interactions between cluster B and C 
(and outcome of RF), which vary with the presence or absence of cluster A.  The a priori 
hypothesis based on the literature was that the presence of cluster B is principal and likely the 
moderating variable that combinations of cluster A and C vary on with regards to RF score.   
Table 10: Comparison differences in mean RF scores    
Pairwise Comparisons
Dependent  Variable: Ref lective f unction score
-.885 1.002 .380 -2.875 1.106
.885 1.002 .380 -1.106 2.875
.539 .686 .434 -.824 1.902
-.539 .686 .434 -1.902 .824
2.167 1.606 .181 -1.023 5.356
-2.167 1.606 .181 -5.356 1.023
-.795 1.069 .459 -2.919 1.328





























(I-J) Std.  Error Sig.a Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Conf idence Interv al for
Dif f erencea
Based on estimated marginal means




     
Note in Table 10 that none of these comparisons reach a level of significance.  This is 
despite of the fact that the use of the Least Significant Difference (LSD) is considered liberal in 
that it runs the risk of meeting significance by error (committing a Type I error).  Therefore, 
although there may be a trend towards an interaction between clusters A, B and C on RF scores, 
the effect of this interaction is small and no direction of this relationship can be determined in 
this sample.  In fact, the observed plot of the relationship between the clusters and RF score 
(Graph 2) does not indicate the hypothesized interaction. The assumption was that the presence 
of Cluster B would correspond to lower RF scores, but that the presence of cluster A would 
result in a relatively flatter slope (Graph 1).     
 
In the hypothesized model, cluster B would yield predictably low RF scores. The 
observed plot does not characterize the hypothesis.  In fact, there is no discernable pattern in this 
model.  However, it should be noted that the ns for these categories are imbalanced and small 
 








YES A DX, YES C DX 
YES A DX, NO C DX 
NO A DX, YES C DX 
NO A DX, NO C DX 
Combinations of Odd (A)  




DRAMATIC (B) DX 
Graph 2: OBSERVED Reflective Functioning (RF)  
                  by Presence/Absence of Cluster B by Clusters A x C 
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(see Table 6).  For example, only 10 subjects in total met for any cluster B diagnoses.  Only 2 
subjects met criteria for cluster B alone, 1 subject met criteria for clusters A and B (but not C), 5 
subjects met criteria for cluster B and cluster C (but not A), and 2 subjects met criteria for a 
diagnosis in each cluster. Furthermore, as discussed above, the interaction itself is found to have 
a small effect.   
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
Panic disorder with comorbid personality disorders and reflective functioning 
The present study examined the relationship between reflective functioning and comorbid 
personality disorders in a population of panic disorder patients.  Analyses explored whether there 
was an interaction between reflective functioning scores and the types and combinations of 
personality disorders as classified by clusters A, B and C.  This analysis was not able to observe 
a predictable model to find or explain an interaction between PD and RF score in this sample.  
However, there was a trend toward a small effect of a three-way interaction between the clusters 
and RF scores, although the nature of this possible relationship was not established. 
There are two arguments to be made to explain these results, essentially that there are no 
far-reaching conclusions to be drawn from this project, but some more specific questions are 
raised.  The first explanation for these findings, that RF does not have a strong relationship to 
different clusters of personality disorders in this panic disorder sample, is that panic 
symptomatology overrode any other symptoms of psychological processes.  The second 
explanation is that deficits in mentalization (as captured by RF scores) may not be apparent in all 
personality disorders, but rather a specific subset of PDs with various comorbidities.  For 
example, borderline PD as comorbid among primary panic disorder patients may not manifest 
the same phenomena as in patients with primary borderline PD.   
The relationship between Axis I and Axis II, in terms of the primary and driving 
pathology, may be one major factor in why the variances in RF scores were not statistically 
significantly different from each other within this sample.   As much as there have been 
assumptions about the effects of Axis II in the treatment of Axis I disorders, as discussed in the 
review on comorbidity, there have also been arguments against the conjecture that Axis II is a 
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confounding factor that primarily interferes with Axis I.  Specifically, that due to panic 
symptoms (or other anxiety disorders) being the principal and dominant pathology, an accurate 
sense of a person’s long term personality traits during an acute phase of panic disorder is difficult 
(Bienvenu & Brandes, 2005).  While an obvious explanation, it may simply be the case that with 
all other diagnoses secondary to panic, the patients in this sample with personality disorders are 
clinically different from those patients with primary personality disorders. 
Furthermore, there is speculation that acute states of panic exaggerate a patient’s 
personality vulnerabilities.  To quote a suggestion made by Skodol et al. (1995) in their paper on 
“Patterns of anxiety and personality disorder comorbidity,” the presence of personality disorders 
may be  
an indication of chronic impairment in functioning that may accompany 
certain cases of anxiety disorder and may worsen during an acute 
exacerbation of an Axis I disorder. (Skodol et al., 1995, p 370.) 
 
 In this case, panic disorder could be an overriding factor.  Given that the patients in this 
sample were selected for panic disorder as their primary complaint, corroborated by a clinical 
interviewer as part of the screening process, any personality disorders would be less prominent 
and potentially less influential on RF.  The interference of a comorbid personality disorder in 
day-to-day functioning may amplify the panic disorder, reinforcing the debilitating 
symptomatology.  Alternatively, when panic symptoms are acute and primary, a personality 
disorder could perhaps be less influential or prominent in impairments of RF.  Specific to this 
study, personality disorders may not have a direct, quantifiable relationship with reflective 
functioning in patients with panic disorder.  This sample constitutes a different population from a 
primary personality disorder population, who experience interference in their lives primarily 
because of their personality disorder, even if they also meet criteria for panic disorder or other 
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Axis I disorders.  Therefore, the personality disorders in this sample of panic disorder patients, 
although detectable, may not be the primary and driving factor in low reflective functioning for 
this group.  On average, this sample had “low” RF scores, but with no significant differences 
between those with personality disorders (averaging 4.4, SD = 1.4) and those without personality 
disorders (averaging 4.2, SD = 1.3).  As an aside, however, it is notable that this “low” RF is 
comparatively not as low as found in existing studies of baseline RF and BPD treatment studies, 
such as Fischer-Kern and colleagues (2010; average RF = 2.7, SD = 1.2) or Levy and colleagues 
(2006;     averages for three treatment groups were 2.86, SD = 1.16; 3.31, SD = 0.95; and 2.8, SD 
= 0.80).  A further direction of study could isolate other factors within this sample, such as 
childhood trauma or agoraphobia to find other causes of the low RF.  Additionally, future 
research could investigate individuals with primary diagnoses of BPD with co-morbid panic 
disorder with or without agoraphobia to examine differences in RF.   
A second argument to explain the lack of findings in this analysis is that no relationship 
may exist between reflective functioning and personality disorders in the context of a primary 
anxiety disorder, even if there remains an open question with regard to borderline personality 
disorder specifically.  In the existing literature, there have been mixed findings with regard to the 
relationship between Axis I and Axis II disorders and RF (Bouchard et al., 2008) in clinical and 
nonclinical samples.  There has been some evidence of a relationship between impaired 
reflective function and borderline personality disorder in comparison to a non-psychiatric group 
(Chiesa & Fonagy, 2013).  This current study is consistent with a previous study on Axis I and 
Axis II disorders and RF, in which no association was found between RF and number of Axis I 
and Axis II disorders (Fischer-Kern et al., 2010). 
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The results of this analysis, that RF does not provide a window for making distinctions 
within a panic disorder population that correlates with psychiatric diagnosis or symptoms per se, 
may not be generalizable to other Axis I disorders, nor to patients who are hospitalized.  Other 
projects, that may otherwise appear comparable to this paper, examine populations that may have 
a different ability to mentalize.  For example, in a study by Fischer-Kern and colleagues (2013) 
regarding depression, as summarized in the literature review section, patients who were 
hospitalized with primary major depression were shown to have lower RF scores than matched 
healthy controls.   
Overall, the sample in this study did have high levels of Axis I comorbidity, with 80% of 
subjects meeting DSM criteria for agoraphobia, 70% of subjects meeting criteria for any anxiety 
disorder other than panic disorder, and 70% meeting criteria for other Axis I disorders (such as 
depression).  However, despite the high symptomatology found within this sample was 
conducted in an outpatient setting, the majority of patients were self-referred, were either 
working or in school, and had no history of hospitalization; thus they were functioning at a 
higher level than studies conducted on inpatients.  The patients in this study were required to 
attend the in-person baseline assessment, which presumes potential agoraphobic symptoms to be 
manageable to the extent that subjects can come to the facility, even if they were accompanied.  
Other studies showing a relationship between RF and other Axis I disorders, such as depression 
(Fischer-Kern et al., 2013) or anorexia (Ward et al., 2001), were inpatients at the time of their 
assessments.  Although clear assessment of severity of symptoms for either of these samples is 
not available, these inpatients may have had higher levels of symptomatology overall that would 
justify a psychiatric hospitalization.   
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Another explanation for the lack of findings in this study may be the use of the 
abbreviated form of RF interview, which may focus more specifically on patients’ capacities for 
mentalization of others’ minds rather than their own.  The RF scale itself conflates representation 
of self with representations of other, but higher RF scores are expected to reflect good working 
capacities in both.  Fonagy and colleagues (1998) also acknowledge that mentalization may not 
be a fully consistent capacity across situations or relationships: 
 
RF is a strand within the developmental web, one of the many 
distinct control systems that are neither strongly connected with 
each other, nor coordinated or integrated. The “fractionation” or 
splitting of all abilities as a function of tasks and domains is well 
demonstrated, and we might expect RF to be subject to the same 
kind of developmental décalage (unevenness) which characterizes 
the rest of cognitive development…Unevenness across situations is 
likely to remain prevalent even in adults, especially when they are 
emotional (Fonagy et al., 1998, p. 8). 
 
This RF interview, in the interest of making the overall assessment less burdensome, asks 
patients to describe only one parent and allows them to choose which parent to speak about.  
Further, it asks patients to choose and describe another significant person in their lives (typically 
a less emotionally-charged relationship).  As discussed in the review of the psychodynamic 
theory on panic disorder, patients may have representations of themselves as weak and that 
others are powerful (Shear et al., 1993).  The demand questions for this abbreviated form of RF 
are focused on the representation of others.  The patients’ scores will be different than if asked to 
reflect on their representation of themselves by the very nature of the patient’s object relations, 




     
 The lack of findings in this study and the potential explanations to account for these 
results suggest interesting new directions for study.  There have been some assumptions about 
the primacy of personality disorders; that is, the presence of personality disorders, especially 
borderline or narcissistic PD, can dwarf Axis I disorders, and therefore disrupt primary Axis I 
disorder treatment that does not specifically account for Axis II disorders.  However, the primary 
symptoms that debilitate a patient’s functioning may override or shape the expression of 
personality difficulties.  One direction of study would be to examine the outcomes of the 
psychotherapy for panic disorder with regard to PD, looking for patterns of response.   
Reflective functioning may not help to make distinctions with regard to Axis I and Axis 
II comorbidity, although the lack of findings here may be specific to panic disorder.  Further 
study into making distinctions between patients with Axis II disorders with regard to RF may 
yield deeper understanding of the nature of RF as a corollary to the diagnostic process.  
Limitations of this study 
 Sampling limitations: 
This project has several significant limitations; therefore, the generalizability of these 
findings must be couched in the context of this analysis.  This study may be limited in its scope 
of applicability.  This project only included patients who could come to the research offices and 
planned to tolerate twice weekly out-patient psychotherapy.  Therefore, it may have excluded the 
most disturbed patients, especially those with severe agoraphobia such as those who could not 
leave their homes, even with a companion.  Furthermore, the mean age of the sample is 41.48 
years (SD = 13.521), putting the majority of subjects approximately within the age range of 28-
55.  This is an older sample as compared to many treatment studies, including Fischer-Kern et al. 
(2010) (mean age = 27.7, SD = 7.3) and the Collaborative Longitudinal Personality Disorders 
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Study, in which the entry age of subjects (in the ten-year study) ranged 18-45 years (Skodol et al. 
2005).  The latter study found a pronounced drop in symptomatology over time across all PDs 
(as measured on the Diagnostic Interview for DSM–IV Personality Disorders (DIPD-IV; 
Zanarini, Frankenburg, Sickel, & Yong, 1996)), particularly within the first four years of the 
study.  BPD symptomatology, including dissociation, dysphoria and cognitive distortions, 
declined over time (Zanarini et al. 2008; Reed et al. 2012; Zanarini et al, 2013).  It is difficult, 
therefore, to draw any conclusion about the relative low levels of personality pathology in this 
panic patient sample.  
However, with regard to the distributions of personality disorders, the sample sizes for 
each cluster are uneven and small in some cases.  In particular, cluster B were not well 
represented, and OCPD was the most represented.  In previous studies, there has been a more 
robust link between cluster B disorders (especially BPD) and low RF, than has been yet found 
with other personality disorders.  Additionally, several factor analytic studies examining the 
DSM PD constructs and clusters have questioned if OCPD stands apart from clusters A, B and C 
altogether, with some evidence that a four-factor structural model better accounts data from 
clinical samples (Sanislow et al. 2009).  A more meaningful and robust comparison between the 
groups may be made with balanced sample sizes, which would have entailed a different 




This study examined the relationship between reflective functioning and personality disorders in 
a sample of patients with primary panic disorder.  Using the statistical models above, although 
some interaction between clusters A, B and C may exist, as a statistical trend was apparent, no 
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meaningful relationship was established.  RF was not found to be predictive of the presence, type 
or number of SCID II diagnosed personality disorders.  The results may suggest that in a sample 
with a primary diagnosis of panic disorder, RF does not correlate with differences in personality 
pathology diagnosed on SCID II, such as has been observed in previous studies with a primary 
personality disorder sample (Levy et al., 2006).  This study may demonstrate limitations in the 
use of RF to distinguish between panic disorder and personality disorders. Further study into the 
relationship between PDs and panic disorder is warranted, particularly with regard to what 
aspects of panic or personality symptomatology become amplified or less observable and are 
primarily challenging and problematic for the patient. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV Lifetime Version  




I. INTIAL INQUIRY 
  
1a. Do you currently have times when you feel a sudden rush of intense fear or discomfort 
(what someone might call a “panic attack”)? 
          YES ___ NO___ 
IF YES, skip to 2a. 
 
b. IF NO, Have you ever had times when you have felt a sudden rush of intense fear or 
discomfort?  
          YES___ NO___ 
    IF YES, When was the most recent time this occurred? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
IF YES to either 1a or 1b., or uncertain, continue  inquiry. 
Otherwise skip to AGORAPHOBIA. 
    
2a. In what kinds of situation(s) do you have these feelings? Where are you most likely to 




b. Do you ever have these feelings come from “out of the blue,” for no apparent reason, or in 
situations where you did not expect them to occur?     YES___ NO____ 
If patient indicates the presence of unexpected panic symptoms, further inquiry is necessary 
to determine if these symptoms occur in a number of situational contexts or whether the 
symptoms are circumscribed to a particular type of situation (as can occur in Social or 
Specific Phobia). 
 
2. How long does it usually take for the rush of fear /discomfort to reach its peak level? 
 ______ minutes 
(Must be less than or equal to 10 minutes to meet diagnostic criteria) 
 
3. How long does the fear/discomfort usually last at its peak level?       ______ minutes 
 
If no evidence of unexpected (uncued) panic attacks that peak in less than  





     
II. SYMPTOM RATINGS 
 
In this section rate symptoms only for panic attacks that occur UNEXPECTEDLY in a variety of 
situations. Panic symptoms that are limited to a single stimulus (e.g., enclosed places or heights, 
social situations, obsessional content, etc.) should not be rated here. 
In mixed or uncertain cases, ratings can be completed in this section. 
Rate the severity of each symptom that is typical of the most recent period of attacks and, when 
appropriate, what characterized a typical attack in a separate past episode of disturbance. If a 
symptom is experienced during only some attacks (i.e., does not typically occur during an 
attack), enclose the rating in parentheses. 
 
DSM-IV defines a panic attack as a discrete period of intense fear or discomfort, in which at 
least 4 of the symptoms listed below developed abruptly and reached a peak within 10 minutes. 
If typical attacks do not include 4 symptoms, determine if any attack has included 4 symptoms. 
 
Use the following inquiry when rating symptoms: 
 
1)   During the panic attack, do you usually experience _____________? 
2) Using Scale A, how distressing/severe is the symptom to you?  If there is any doubt about 
whether the symptom is typical, ask: Do you experience this nearly every time you have an 
attack? 
                   0--------1----------2---------3---------4---------5---------6---------7---------8 
                 None                     Mild                 Moderate            Severe             Very severe 
  
        FULL     LSA    COMMENTS 
a. Palpitations, pounding heart, or accelerated heart rate        _____    ____     ___________ 
b. Sweating                                                                              _____    ____     ___________ 
c. Trembling or shaking                                                           _____    ____     ___________ 
d. Shortness of breath or smothering sensations                      _____    ____     ___________ 
e. Feeling of choking                                                                _____    ____     ___________ 
f. Chest pain or discomfort                                                       _____    ____     ___________ 
g. Nausea or stomach distress                                                  _____    ____     ___________ 
h. Chills or hot flushes                                                             _____    ____     ___________ 
i. Dizziness, unsteady feelings, lightheadedness, or faintness _____    ____     ___________ 
j. Feelings of unreality or being detached from oneself          _____    ____     ___________ 
k. Numbing or tingling sensations                                           _____    ____     ___________ 
l. Fear of dying                                                                        _____    ____      ___________ 
m. Fear of going crazy                                                             _____   ____      ___________ 
n. Fear of doing something uncontrolled                                _____    ____      ___________ 
       
2a. If the patient reports 4 or more symptoms per typical attack of at least Moderate Severity 
(i.e., 4 or above), ask: 
Do you have periods (attack/spells) when you have a sudden, unexpected rush of 
fear/discomfort that is accompanied by only one or two these symptoms? 
         YES____ NO_____ 
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If YES, go back and rate severity of symptoms under Limited Symptom Attack (LSA)        
column. 
 b. If the patient reports less than 4 symptoms per typical attack, ask: 
Do you have periods (attack/spells) when you have had a sudden, unexpected rush of 
fear/discomfort that is accompanied by four or more of these symptoms? 
                                                                                                                  YES ____ NO_____ 
If YES, go back and rate severity of symptoms under Full Attack (FULL) column, switching 
rating for typical, recent panic attacks to the Limited Symptom Attack (LSA) column. 
 
III. CURRENT EPISODE 
 
Now I want to ask you a series of questions about this current period of panic attacks. 
 
1a. How many panic attacks have you had in the past month? 
                                                                                                 ________Full ________Limited 
b.   How many panic attacks have you had in the past 6 months? 
        ________ Full _______Limited 
Using the following scale as a guide, rate how much you have been worried about, or how 
apprehensive you have been, of having another panic attack.  
 
                  0---------1----------2----------3----------4-----------5----------6---------7-----------8 
                 No                      Rarely                  Occasionally            Frequently            Constantly 
               Worry/                worried/                   worried/                  worried/                worried/ 
                 No                       Mild                      Moderate                  Severe                 Extreme 
           apprehension       apprehension          apprehension            apprehension       apprehension 
                                                                                          
If no evidence of persistent concern/worry about panic over past month ask, Since your first 
attacks, has there been a period of a month a more when you were worried that you might have 
more attacks? 
         YES _____ NO __________ 
If YES, When was this? 
       FROM______________  TO____________ 
b. Specifically, what types of things do you anticipate happening as the result of the attacks? 
    (Inquire about immediate and long-term consequences.) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
c. Have the attacks caused you to change your behavior/lifestyle in any way?   
                                                                                                               YES______ NO_______ 
If YES, how so? ______________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 






     
Interoceptive sensitivity/avoidance (e.g., physical exertion, sex, caffeine, expressing strong 
emotions, hot places, thrilling movies, activities that heighten awareness of bodily sensations): 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Safety signals (e.g., medications, people, access to telephones/car): 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Distraction (loud music, keeping TV on, staying involved in activities): 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Lifestyle changes (e.g., reduction in “stressful” activities): 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
(Patient must have 2a, 2b, OR 2C for at least one month in order to meet Panic Disorder 
criteria.) 
3. In what ways have the panics interfered with your life (e.g., daily routine, job, social 




Using Scale A as a guide, rate how much panic attacks have interfered with your life. 
interference: ___________________  




          None                      Mild                      Moderate                     Severe                   Very severe 
 
4a. Can you recall your first panic attack that began this current period of attacks? 
                                                                                                                   YES _____ NO_____ 
         If YES, When did it happen? ______________Month _______________Year 
  b. Were you under any type of stress during this time? 
                                                                                                                   YES ______NO _____ 








(4)Legal matters? _____________________________________________ 
(5)Health (self/others)? _________________________________________ 
c. On the day of this first attack, were you taking any type of drug? (Include alcohol/caffeine.) 
                                                                                                        YES _______ NO ________ 
If YES, specify type/amount: ___________________________________________________ 
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5. Just prior to or since the panic attacks began, have you been regularly taking any types of 
drugs? 
                                                                                                         YES _______ NO ________ 
Specify (type; amount; dates of use): __________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
  
6. Just prior to or since the panic attacks began, have you had any physical condition such as 
inner ear problems, mitral valve prolapse, pregnancy, hyperthyroidism, hypoglycemia? 
YES_______ NO_______ 
       Specify (type; date of onset/remission): ________________________________________ 
       ________________________________________________________________________ 
    7. When did the panic attacks become a problem in that they occurred regularly and/or you 
became very worried or anxious about having more attacks, or the attacks caused a change in 
your behavior in some way? (Note: if patient is vague in date of onset, attempt to ascertain 
more specific information, e.g., by linking onset to objective life events). 
            _________________________________________________________________________ 
         Date of Onset: _______________Month: ________________ Year: ______________ 
8.   What types of things seem to trigger the attacks? [Inquire about internal (thoughts, 
sensations, images) and external (feared situations, situations that elicit heightened self-focused 
attention, physical effects of various activities such as caffeine, exercise, etc). triggers.] 
         _______________________________________________________________________ 
         _______________________________________________________________________ 
 




10. Besides this current period of panic attacks, have there been other, separate periods of time 
before this when you have had these attacks? 
 
If YES, the clinician should consider inquiring about past episode, particularly if the 
clinician determines that this information may be important for clinical or diagnostic 
reasons. 
Date(s) of prior episodes: _________________________________________________ 
 
 




     
Appendix 2: Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders  
(SCID II)  
SCID-II QUESTIONNAIRE 
INSTRUCTIONS: These questions are about the kind of person you generally are; that is, how 
you usually have felt or behaved over the past several years. Fill in “Yes” or “No.” Answer all 
the questions. If a question is unclear, pick the answer that best describes the kind of person that 
you are. 
1. Have you avoided jobs or assignments that involved having to deal with a  { Yes { No 
 lot of other people? 
2. Do you avoid getting involved with people unless you are certain they will  { Yes { No 
 like you? 
3. Do you find it hard to be “open” even with people you are close to?   { Yes { No 
4. Do you often worry about being criticized or rejected in social situations?  { Yes { No 
5. Are you usually quiet when you meet people?      { Yes { No 
6. Do you believe that you are not as good, as smart, or as attractive as most  { Yes { No 
 other people? 
7. Are you afraid to try new things?        { Yes { No 
8. Do you need a lot of advice or reassurance from others before you can make  { Yes { No 
 everyday decisions – such as what to wear or what in order in a restaurant? 
9. Do you depend on other people to handle important areas in your life such  { Yes { No 
 as finances, child care, living arrangements? 
10. Do you find it hard to disagree with people even when you think they are  { Yes { No 
 wrong? 
11. Do you find it hard to start work on tasks when there is no one to help you?  { Yes { No 
12. Have you often volunteered to do things that are unpleasant?    { Yes { No 
13. Do you usually feel uncomfortable when you are by yourself?    { Yes { No 
14. When a close relationship ends, do you quickly need to find someone else  { Yes { No 
 you can rely on? 
15. Do you worry a lot about being left alone to take care of yourself?   { Yes { No 
16. Are you the kind of person who focuses on details, order, and organization,  { Yes { No 
 or likes to make lists and schedules?   
17. Do you have trouble finishing jobs because you spend so much time trying  { Yes { No 
 to get things exactly right? 
18. Do you or other people feel that you are so devoted to work (school) that  { Yes { No 
 you have no time left for anyone else or for just having fun? 
19. Do you have very high standards about what is right and what is wrong?  { Yes { No 
20. Do you have trouble throwing things out because they might come in handy  { Yes { No 
 some day? 
21. Is it hard for you to let other people help out if they don’t agree to do things  { Yes { No 
 exactly the way you want? 
22. Is it hard for you to spend money on yourself and other people even when { Yes { No 
 you have enough? 
23. Are you often so sure you are right that it doesn’t matter what other people  { Yes { No 
 say? 
24. Have other people told you that you are stubborn or rigid?    { Yes { No 
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25. When someone asks you to do something that you don’t want to do, do you  { Yes { No 
 say “yes” but then work slowly or do a bad job? 
26. Often, if you don’t want to do something you just “forget” to do it?   { Yes { No 
27. Do you often feel that other people don’t understand you, or don’t appreciate  { Yes { No 
 how much you do? 
28. Are you often gloomy and likely to get into arguments?    { Yes { No 
29. Have you often found that most of your bosses, teachers, supervisors, doctors,  { Yes { No 
 and others who are supposed to know what they are doing really don’t? 
30. Do you often think that it’s not fair that other people have more than you do?  { Yes { No 
31. Do you often complain that only bad things happen to you?    { Yes { No 
32. Do you often go back and forth between telling someone off and then trying  { Yes { No 
 to make up by doing whatever they want? 
33. Do you usually feel unhappy or like life is no fun?     { Yes { No 
34. Do you believe that you are basically an inadequate person and often feel  { Yes { No 
 not good about yourself? 
35. Do you often put yourself down?       { Yes { No   
36. Are you a worrier?         { Yes { No 
37. Do you often judge others harshly and easily find fault with them?   { Yes { No 
38. Do you think that most people are basically no good?     { Yes { No 
39. Do you almost always expect the worst?      { Yes { No 
40. Do you often feel guilty about things you have or haven’t done?   { Yes { No 
41. Do you often have to keep an eye out to stop people from using you or  { Yes { No 
 hurting you? 
42. Do you spend a lot of time wondering if you can trust your friends or the  { Yes { No 
 people you work with? 
43. Do you find that it is best not to let other people know too much about you?  { Yes { No 
44. Do you often pick up hidden meanings in what people say or do?   { Yes { No 
45. Are you the kind of person who holds grudges or takes a long time to   { Yes { No 
 forgive people who have insulted or slighted you? 
46. Are there many people that you can’t forgive because they did or said   { Yes { No 
 something to you a long time ago? 
47. Do you often get angry or lash out when someone criticizes or insults you  { Yes { No 
 in some way? 
48. Have you often suspected that your spouse or partner has been unfaithful?  { Yes { No 
49. When you are out in public and see people talking, do you often feel that they  { Yes { No 
 are talking about you? 
50. Do you often get the feeling that things that appear to be unrelated are really  { Yes { No 
 meant to give you a special meaning? 
51. Do you often detect hidden messages in seemingly unrelated events?   { Yes { No 
52. Have you ever felt that you could make things happen just by making a wish  { Yes { No 
 or thinking about them? 
53. Have you had personal experiences with the supernatural?    { Yes { No 
54. Do you believe that you have a “sixth sense” that allows you to know and  { Yes { No 
 predict things that others can’t?   
55. Do you often think that objects or shadows are really people or animals or  { Yes { No 
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 that noises are actually people’s voices? 
56. Have you had the sense that some person or force is around you, even   { Yes { No 
 though you cannot see anyone? 
57. Do you often see auras or energy fields around people?     { Yes { No 
58. Are there very few people that you are really close to outside of you   { Yes { No 
 immediate family? 
59. Do you often feel nervous when you are around other people?    { Yes { No 
60. Do you NOT feel close relationships with other people like family or friends?  { Yes { No 
61. Would you rather do things alone than with other people?    { Yes { No 
62. Could you be content without being sexually involved with another person?  { Yes { No 
63. Are there really very few things that give you a lot of pleasure?   { Yes { No 
64. Does it not matter to you what people think of you?     { Yes { No 
65. Do you find that nothing makes you very happy or very sad?    { Yes { No 
66. Do you like to be the center of attention?      { Yes { No 
67. Do you flirt a lot?         { Yes { No 
68. Do you often dress in a sexy way, even when you are going to work or  { Yes { No 
 doing errands? 
69. Do you try to draw attention to yourself by the way you look or the way you  { Yes { No 
 dress? 
70. Do you often make a point of being dramatic or colorful?    { Yes { No 
71. Do you find that your own opinions and feelings about things are not very  { Yes { No 
 strong so that you go along with other people’s opinions? 
72. Do you become very close with nearly everyone you meet?    { Yes { No 
73. Do most people fail to appreciate your very special talents or    { Yes { No 
 accomplishments? 
74. Have people told you that you have too high an opinion of yourself?   { Yes { No 
75. Do you think a lot about the power, fame, or recognition that will be yours  { Yes { No 
 someday?   
76. Do you think a lot about the perfect romance that will be yours someday?  { Yes { No 
77. When you have a problem, do you almost always insist on seeing the top  { Yes { No 
 person? 
78. Do you feel its worth spending time only with people who are special or  { Yes { No 
 important? 
79. Is it very important to you that people pay attention to you or admire you in  { Yes { No 
 some way? 
80. Do you think that it’s not necessary to follow certain rules or social   { Yes { No 
 conventions when they get in your way? 
81. Do you often feel that there are reasons why other people should give you  { Yes { No 
 especially good treatment? 
82. Do you often find it necessary to step on a few toes to get what you want?  { Yes { No 
83. Do you often have to put your needs above other people’s?    { Yes { No 
84. Do you often expect other people to do what you ask without question   { Yes { No 
 because of who you are? 
85. Do you often feel that it’s not important to deal with other people’s concerns  { Yes { No 
 or feelings? 
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86. Does it burn you up when other people do well?     { Yes { No 
87. Do you feel that others are often envious of you?     { Yes { No 
88. Do you find that very few people are worth your time and attention?   { Yes { No 
89. Have you often become frantic when you thought that someone you really  { Yes { No 
 care about was going to leave you? 
90. Do your relationships with other people you really care about have lots  { Yes { No 
 of ups and downs? 
91. Have you abruptly changed your sense of who you are and where you are  { Yes { No 
 headed? 
92. Does your sense of who you are often change dramatically?    { Yes { No 
93. Have there been lots of sudden changes in your goals, career plans, religious  { Yes { No 
 beliefs, and so on? 
94. Have you often done things impulsively?      { Yes { No   
95. Have you tried to hurt or kill yourself or threatened to do so?    { Yes { No 
96. Have you ever cut, burned, or scratched yourself on purpose?    { Yes { No 
97. Are you a “moody” person?        { Yes { No 
98. Do you often feel empty inside?        { Yes { No 
99. Do you often have temper outbursts or get so angry that you lose control?  { Yes { No 
100. Do you hit people or throw things when you get angry?    { Yes { No 
101. Do even little things get you very angry?      { Yes { No 
102. Do you get suspicious of other people or feel especially spaced out when  { Yes { No 
 you are under a lot of stress? 
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE ABOUT THINGS THAT YOU MAY HAVE DONE 
BEFORE YOU WERE FIFTEEN 
103. …did you bully or threaten other kids?       { Yes { No 
104. …did you start fights?         { Yes { No 
105. …did you use a weapon in a fight, like a bat, brick, broken bottle, a knife or  { Yes { No 
 gun? 
106. …did you ever deliberately try to cause someone physical pain and   { Yes { No 
 suffering? 
107. …did you sometimes hurt animals on purpose?     { Yes { No 
108. …did you ever forcibly take something from someone by threatening,  { Yes { No 
 robbing, or mugging him or her? 
109. …did you ever force someone to have sex with you?     { Yes { No 
110. …did you set fires?         { Yes { No 
111. …did you deliberately damage things that weren’t yours?    { Yes { No 
112. …did you ever break into a house, other building, or car?    { Yes { No 
113. …did you lie a lot or con other people?      { Yes { No 
114. …did you ever steal or shoplift things?       { Yes { No 
115. …did you run away from home and stay away overnight?    { Yes { No   
BEFORE YOU WERE 13 
116. …would you often stay out very late, long after the time you were supposed  { Yes { No 
 to be home? 
117. …did you often skip school?        { Yes { No 
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Appendix 3: Reflective Functioning Interview: 
1.  A. Can you tell me about one of your parents? What is that parent like? 
 
 B. How do you think your relationship came to be that way? 
 
2. A. Can you tell me about your relationship? 
  
 B. Do you have any thoughts about how your relationship came to be that way?  
(Alternative form of question: …about how these conflicts and problems 
developed?…about how it came to be such a close relationship?) 
 
3. Can you tell me about a specific memory of that relationship or about that parent from 
childhood? (ages 5-12?) 
 
4. Can you tell me how this relationship has changed over time?  
(Ask why it has changed if they don’t address this in their answer.) 
 
5. Can you tell me what impact this parent has had on your life? 
 
6. Can you tell me why you chose to talk about this parent? 
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